A.Weyl Fokker: The Creative Years (Putnam)

At the time when the initial production order for M.5s was placed, the IdFlieg let Fokker know that in their opinion a two-seat aircraft would be preferable for military purposes. The emphasis in Germany, as in France, had shifted from the single-seat tactical scout to the light artillery spotter carrying an observer and able to operate from front-line fields close to the batteries. For this requirement an aircraft giving a good downward view and adequate room for the observer was essential: the cramped accommodation of the M.5 would not do. It was therefore suggested to Fokker that he should develop his monoplane into a proper two-seater while retaining its main characteristics.
   Fokker and Kreutzer doubtless knew that some French designers had resorted to the parasol wing arrangement to provide a completely unobstructed downward view. Fokker also knew that the Pfalz concern had acquired a licence to build the Morane-Saulnier Parasol monoplane. One such Morane-Saulnier Parasol had been built at Speyer and had been demonstrated at Schleissheim to the Bavarian Army authorities.
   Fokker did not like the idea of having an aircraft’s centre of gravity below its wing, possibly because he had heard that parasol monoplanes could be subject to unpleasant slow oscillations. He did not go the whole hog with a true parasol monoplane but produced an aircraft with its wing slightly above the fuselage in a position roughly mid-way between those that characterized shoulder-wing and parasol monoplanes. This was the Fokker M.6.
   The span and wing area of the M.6 were roughly the same as those of the M.5L. As on the single-seater, there were three bracing points on each spar and the bracing pylon was as tall as that of the M.5L fuselage. The cabane structure to which the wings were attached supported the front spars about 16 in. above the top longerons; the steel tube that connected the rear spars formed a sketchy division between the two cockpits. To facilitate access to the cockpits the centre-section was left uncovered, and the trailing portion of each wing was cut away.
   The M.6 fuselage was slightly longer than that of the M.5L. The seats were separate but still so close together that little more than a very small hand camera and a signal pistol could be accommodated. The M.6 differed from contemporary Service aircraft of the A and B categories by accommodating its pilot in the front seat. This gave him a good field of forward vision, but he and his observer were not otherwise comfortable, for the cockpits were excessively draughty.
   The M.6 was a short-lived and unlucky aircraft. It was evaluated by air corps officers at Schwerin, and Fokker was urged to improve the downwards field of vision. While it was still undergoing its evaluation trials, Oberleutnant Kolbe tried it. It was his second flight in a Fokker monoplane, and he took Hauptmann Ruff, a pupil of the Goerries school, with him as passenger. While airborne Kolbe apparently misused a three-way fuel cock: when the engine stopped, deprived of fuel, he attempted an emergency landing in allotments near the aerodrome but the aircraft crashed. It was wrecked; the pilot died hours later from an unsuspected internal haemorrhage; Ruff escaped with a fractured thigh.
   By now the clouds of war were massing and aircraft were urgently wanted. The Fokker M.8, an improved artillery spotter, was virtually ordered “off the drawing board” - the Army placed a provisional order for twenty, paying their usual one-third of the price in advance, before the prototype flew. The type number M.7 had been allocated to a light two-seat biplane, powered by the 80-h.p. Oberursel but having a longer range than its predecessors. This aircraft was designed to meet the requirements of the German Admiralty, who were also in a hurry to obtain aircraft and were willing to pay handsomely for them.
   The Austro-Hungarian government, desperately short of aircraft because of their misguided policy of standardizing the faulty Lohner biplane, also came to Fokker seeking military aircraft for early delivery. They also offered to provide facilities for the licence production of suitable types in Austria and Hungary.
   Fokker eagerly accepted all orders without considering whether he could fulfil them. The first orders for the M.5 and his success as an aerobatic performer had set his business on its feet and it was making a handsome profit. The Military Flying School was run in exemplary fashion by de Waal: it was working to capacity, had suffered few crashes, and was making good money. Fokker’s Dutch backers began to receive worthwhile dividends from their investments and realized that aviation was a Good Thing; his family saw that their erstwhile black sheep was not such a fool in business after all. And the war made things even better.


WAR

   On the first day of mobilization, Fokker and all other German aircraft manufacturers were informed by telegram that all aviation material was subject to requisition by the Army. The Navy protested, for they had placed orders of their own with Fokker by arrangement with the War Ministry. Naval officers hastened to Schwerin and offered higher prices for anything with wings. Officers from operational units also came, bent on acquiring some of the coveted new Fokkers.
   Fokker was delighted to find himself for once in a seller’s market. He was only too willing to sell to anybody: had the Allies come for his aeroplanes he would have sold to them just as readily. For cash, of course.
   So he sold whatever aircraft were at Schwerin to the highest bidder, and at prices he would never have dreamt of a few weeks earlier. He quickly got rid of all the junk that had accumulated for want of customers. He even sold aircraft that did not belong to him: for instance, von Bismarck’s precious Gartenlaube and the M.3A that he had palmed off on Worobieff.
   On the following day Leutnant von Buttlar came to fetch his gruner Vogel (green bird) M.5L for his squadron. Fokker had not dared to sell that.
   Another visitor was Colonel von Eberhardt, who delivered a stern and pointed homily to Fokker. The Inspector found that production at Schwerin was lamentably inadequate. By accepting orders from the Army, the Navy, and from Austria, Fokker had undertaken far more than his factory could produce; he was messing about with experiments instead of getting on with the production of aircraft that the Army now needed so urgently; Fokker ought to realize that output was all that mattered, at the moment.
   The rebuke was well merited. Fokker had rashly accepted every order offered to him, quoting impossible delivery dates, without considering how they could possibly be fulfilled. The Army had long-standing orders for M.5Ls and for a substantial number of two-seat artillery spotters developed from the M.6. The Navy had just ordered seven two-seat biplanes of a type (M.7) still to be built (Order No. B.1043 to 1049/14) at £825 per airframe, without engine and instruments - a very good price. No performance had been specified, and Fokker had promised delivery from October 1914. He had promised the Austrians all the aircraft they wanted; and they wanted more than his whole factory could produce in a year.
   Fokker’s works consisted of a pitiful collection of old huts and shacks, neither equipped nor manned for any kind of quantity production. The most that Fokker and his collaborators had ever produced were two of the simplest aeroplanes at a time. The greatest handicap of all was Fokker’s lack of technical knowledge, for he did not know how to set about production in batches or series. His reluctance to invest in production equipment was fatal. Lissauer’s advice had long been forgotten.
   Fokker’s business instinct told him that the IdFlieg now meant business: if he was not to be kicked out of his works he would have to come up to scratch. Moreover, as an alien in a country at war he could scarcely expect to be given special consideration. He therefore promised to give priority to the Army, to whom he was so much indebted, and to speed the delivery of Army aircraft. The M.7 biplane for the Navy and for the Austrians was set aside, and all efforts were concentrated on the completion and testing of the M.8 artillery-spotting monoplane. A strenuous day-and-night routine for the staff began; more workmen were engaged and the workshops were enlarged.
   Glad to see the efforts of the Fokker team, Col. von Eberhardt decided to form an artillery-observation squadron equipped throughout with the new M.8. The order for this type was increased to more than forty aircraft; they were designated Fok. A, later Fok. AT. They and the back-log of 24 M.5L were to be produced with all possible speed.
   At the same time, thirty officers were attached to the Fokker school, most of them for conversion training. Unfortunately, the school had been left with very few aeroplanes, none of which had a rotary engine, and it was difficult for de Waal and his instructors to keep flying training going. Worobieff’s M.3A, which the Service had returned as unsuitable, was pressed into use as a trainer. Unpleasant to handle and barely controllable, it was cordially disliked by every instructor. Fokker recognized it as a source of danger and suggested to Ditzuleit (whose exclusive training aircraft it somehow became) that he should put it out of its misery by crashing it. This was ultimately achieved, quite unintentionally, in the course of an emergency landing. Shortly afterwards Ditzuleit joined the Navy to become their Fokker pilot.
   Fokker realized that the school needed more aircraft, and went on building up his labour force to meet the increasing demands. Fortunately the structural simplicity of Fokker aircraft enabled inexperienced workers to make a useful contribution to production in a short time.
   From the fronts came news of the exploits of Fokker aircraft. Late in August, Hauptmann Goebel had to make a forced landing in French-held territory during a flight to Sedan from Air Depot No. 4 at Trier. Evidently the Oberursel had failed again. On August 30, 1914, Leutnant von Beaulieu, flying an M.5, made an impressive reconnaissance in the Charleroi sector. Leutnant von Hiddessen had been over Paris in a Fokker. In September an M.5 had been forced to land near St.Omer and was captured intact. Allied pilots flew it up to 8,000 ft. and were quite impressed.
   One of the pilots who made good use of the M.5L was Oblt. H. Kastner. He was with No. 38 Feldfliegerabteilung, stationed at Brussels and later at Ghent. Using his M.5L as a two-seater with Lt. Niemann as observer, Kastner made successful reconnaissances during the Dixmude fighting on the Yser. He later took the monoplane to the Eastern Front, where it ended its career during a forced landing, the Oberursel having been at fault again.
   Kastner’s notable successes on the Fokker made other squadrons eager to have similar aircraft. Among them was the squadron led by Oblt. Freiherr von Freyberg.
   Fokker kept his promise to make speedy deliveries of aircraft to the Army, for the first production M.8s were handed over in October 1914.
   The M.8 was a true shoulder-wing monoplane, the wings being attached to the upper longerons. Large apertures were provided in the fuselage sides under the wings to give the occupants a good field of downward vision; side-mounted windscreens were fitted to the operational M.8s to make downward observation more comfortable. The crew sat in close tandem in the single large cockpit.
   The span and chord of the wings had been increased, and the area was now 20 sq. m. (216 sq. ft.); the wing loading was therefore about the same as that of the M.5L flown as a single-seater, consequently the take-off and climb were good. The spars were farther apart than those of the M.5 and the ribs were more widely spaced, to keep the weight down. The wing-bracing cables had quick-release devices for easy dismantling in the field. For road transport the wings were strapped along the sides of the fuselage. The M.8, like all Fokker aircraft, was eminently transportable. This was an important consideration, for German replacement aircraft were never as a rule flown to the front or to base formations.
   The M.8 fuselage was about 40% wider than that of the M.5 and two slim people could even sit side-by-side in it. The main petrol tank, with a separate compartment for the castor oil, was mounted behind the engine and had a fuel gauge that could easily be seen by the pilot; the feed was by gravity. Behind the cockpit was a supplementary tank of the kind intended for von Bismarck’s Gartenlaube. Both tanks were of brass sheet and had an oval cross-section. The petrol feed from the rear tank to the gravity tank was by pressure. To provide the necessary pressure a hand pump was fitted in the cockpit; later, a windmill-driven fuel pump was fitted.
   The M.8 incorporated several refinements of detail. The control column had a convenient two-handle grip with the blip-switch button between the handles. This feature was reproduced on all subsequent Fokker aircraft.
   In their flying characteristics the Fokker M.8 and its relations differed from the typical contemporary German B-types. The Fokkers did not automatically assume the correct angle of bank when turning: they had to be rolled with their powerful wing warping and held in the banked attitude while turning. The German pilots had to learn this difference in handling. They also had to learn that, in gusty weather, the M.8 flew best when the stick was held loosely so that the wings could flex freely under the gust loads. The M.8 then rode through gusts far more smoothly than other German aircraft with their great stability, and the strain on pilot and aircraft was much less.
   The M.8 never passed a proper acceptance test, but it seems that strength demonstrations satisfied the authorities even though they were made in the usual Fokker manner with “live loads” standing on the wings of the inverted aircraft.
   As planned by the IdFlieg in August, two Fokker squadrons of six aircraft each were formed for artillery spotting and tactical reconnaissance. These units, Feldfliegerabteilungen 40 and 41, flew Fokker M.8 monoplanes exclusively until late 1915. In the Service the M.8 was designated Fok. A (later Fok. A.I) to distinguish it from the M.5K and M.5L.
   Individual Fok. A’s were allocated to various other field squadrons and to the newly formed B.A.O. and B.A.M. formations for target reconnaissance. All the Fok. A’s were flown by selected pilots. One of the earliest of these was Lt. Parschau of B.A.O. who had previously managed to get one of the few M.5s in the Service. He had become friendly with Fokker, who appreciated his splendid airmanship.
   On November 11, 1914, Parschau landed his Fok. A at Pontfaverger in the Rheims sector, having come from the base aircraft park at Rethel. By chance he met the young Lt. Oswald Boelcke of Feldfliegerabteilung 13 whom he had known at the Darmstadt air station (where Boelcke had completed his training on biplanes). Boelcke took an immediate liking to the Fokker and applied for one. Although he had learned to fly at the Halberstadt flying school, it is doubtful whether Boelcke had flown a rotary-engined aeroplane before. On November 26 a Fok. A became available at Rethel but was reserved for another officer. When Boelcke complained vigorously another Fok. A was ordered for him. It was delivered on December 9, and he flew it immediately from Rethel to Pontfaverger, and from then on it was in regular operational use for short-range missions.
   Other pilots had to undergo a conversion course at Schwerin unless, like Oblt. H. Kastner and Oblt, von Hiddessen, they had previously flown similar monoplanes. Oblt. A. Muehlig-Hofmann (the first military pilot of the Fokker Spider) and B. Wentscher were among those who went to Schwerin to collect their Fok. A monoplanes. Both arrived there during December 1914. Muehlig-Hofmann left in January 1915 with Fok. A. 195/14, which he flew extensively on the Eastern Front for artillery observation. He had the opportunity of comparing it with a captured Russian Morane-Saulnier Parasol, and found the Fok. A more pleasant to handle; the Morane was distinctly more prone to spin. Wentscher also flew on the Eastern Front, spotting for the artillery of the 3rd Army. His was the only Fokker in that Army; later he had one of the first Fokker M.10 biplanes for the same kind of work, but equipped with wireless for signalling to the artillery batteries.
   Oblt. Kastner flew his Fok. A.202/14 with conspicuous success on the Eastern Front until he was ordered to form Feldfliegerabteilung 62, a unit whose name will appear in later pages.
   Fok. A.136/14 was one of the few M.8s that were supplied to the coast-defence units of the Navy.
   The official (but not necessarily comprehensive) Army records for December 1914 mention ten fully operational Fok. A of the M.8 type. By June 1915 the number had risen to fifteen, but thereafter the remaining M.8s were allocated to training units. Their operational value had declined because they carried no wireless and their climbing performance was no longer good enough even for the Eastern Front.
   As trainers the M.8s rendered sterling service up to the end of 1917, notably at Schwerin. Some were later used at units training fighter pilots, and it is probable that more M.8s were built for instructional purposes than for operational duties.
   The speed with which the M.8 was produced was a considerable achievement, especially in view of the primitive and limited facilities at Schwerin. Early in 1915 photographs were published showing a batch of fourteen M.8s and one M.5L ready for delivery at Schwerin. But the pressing demands of the front and the schools were more than Fokker’s works could meet. The Halberstadter Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H, was therefore asked to build a batch of M.8s under licence. These aircraft had the factory type number Halberstadt F.14 and the service designation Halb. A.II (Halb. A.I was a Taube type supplied to air corps units before the war).
   The Halb. A.II with 80-h.p. Oberursel was practically indistinguishable from the Fokker-built trainer version of the M.8. Until the large-scale production of the Fok. D.VH was initiated in 1918 the M.8 was the only Fokker design to be produced under licence. The first two Halb. A.II appeared at the front late in 1914. In the spring of the following year five were operational. All were withdrawn in August 1915 and taken over by the military flying school at Halberstadt. The Halb. A.II weighed 363 kg. empty and 645 kg. in flying trim; its load was 180 kg., and the wing weight was stated to be 95 kg. The Halberstadt concern did not seek to develop its experience with welded steel-tube fuselages but reverted to wooden construction and adhered to it until the end of the war.
   A Fok. A was captured intact in the British sector early in 1915. In the descriptions that appeared in French and British aviation journals the Fokker was dismissed as an inferior copy of the Morane-Saulnier, and it seemed that no Allied pilot had tested the machine sufficiently thoroughly to establish its full capabilities. Its performance was of course not outstanding, especially at altitude; and the Oberursel was much inferior to the rotary engines available to the Allies.
   If the Fokker M.8 was popular with its crews the engineering experts at home were less enthusiastic. Reports from the front indicated an alarmingly poor serviceability rate for Fokker aircraft of all types and a high accident rate. The root of the trouble was the engine, its unreliability made the greater because of maintenance by unskilled mechanics. At the behest of the IdFlieg a commission of three competent civilian engineers were sent to the front to make a technical appraisement of the Fokker A’s of Feldfliegerabteilung 40.
   The findings of the investigation were by no means unfavourable, considering that the new aircraft had been put into production and sent to the front with little time for trials. However, the commission questioned the advisability of welding vital components, for welding was still prohibited in the official technical requirements. The commission thought that the Fokker fuselage should be replaced by a wooden structure similar to that of the Pfalz monoplanes. Dorner went to Schwerin to discuss with Fokker the redesign of the Fok. A.
   Fokker, always out of his depth when tackled by engineering experts, passed Dorner to Kreutzer for the discussion of the technical aspects. Kreutzer, nonplussed by the eminently qualified designer’s weighty arguments against the reliability of welding in general and welded steeltube fuselages in particular, called in Platz.
   Dorner immediately recognized Platz as the welding expert who had done some exceedingly tricky jobs for him some years before. An atmosphere of friendly understanding was quickly created and Dorner was prepared to hear Platz’s arguments in favour of the Fokker construction methods. Having heard them he agreed to Platz’s suggestion that fuselages or other components specified by Dorner should be tested to destruction and that, if they proved to have a satisfactory margin of strength without failure on account of faulty welding, the IdFlieg commission would not, at least for the time being, insist upon the re-design of the monoplane.
   Platz quickly conducted the required proof-loadings on specimens selected by Dorner. Dorner, of course, was present at these tests; Fokker kept out of the way. The results were exceedingly good: none of the welding proved defective; and in fact the tested structures far exceeded in strength and resilience what Kreutzer and Platz had claimed. There could be no doubt that the structural methods were entirely sound and safe.
   Dorner returned to Adlershof, and nothing further was heard at Schwerin about wooden fuselages for the Fokker A. Nevertheless the technical requirements governing the acceptance of military aircraft continued to state that weldings in vital structural components were forbidden. Eighteen months later the welded steel-tube fuselage again fell under suspicion.