А.Александров, Г.Петров Крылатые пленники России

Идею о самолете со свободнонесущим крылом удалось полностью реализовать в моноплане "Фоккер Д. VIII", также известным под обозначением "Фоккер Е. V". Его сконструировали под мотор "Оберурсель" (Oberursel) 110 л. с. ко второму конкурсу истребителей, проходившему в период с мая по июнь 1918 г. По результатам, показанным в этих состязаниях, фронтовые пилоты признали модель лучшей среди машин с ротативными двигателями и рекомендовали заказать опытную партию из 10 штук. Однако создатели настолько верили в успех, что начали серийное производство еще до того. В августе "Е-пятые" стали поступать в боевые отряды, спровоцировав своими характеристиками настоящую эйфорию у летчиков и получив прозвище "летающая бритва". Увы, 16 и 19 августа (н. ст.), два авиатора погибли из-за разрушения крыльев их самолетов в воздухе. Расследование установило, что аварии явились следствием проникновения влаги внутрь обшитых фанерой несущих поверхностей, недостаточной прочности лонжеронов и небрежности сборки. Примерно через полтора месяца дефекты устранили и приемка аппаратов, называемых теперь "Фоккерами Д. VIII", возобновилась. Однако замена всех крыльев требовала много времени, репутация модели была подмочена (даже в буквальном смысле!), и после третьего конкурса, состоявшегося в октябре - ноябре, не последовало ни одного заказа на "восьмерки". Вероятно, они почти не принимали участия в боевых действиях, но война для фоккеровских монопланов не закончилась в 1918 г., так как малая часть из примерно 300 построенных продолжала летать в разных странах, в том числе в Польше. Последняя использовала 8 "Фоккеров Е. V", один из которых с летчиком Юлианом Ясинским (Julian Jasinski) во время советско-польского конфликта совершил вынужденную посадку на аэродроме красных или же сделал это добровольно (81, о). Как бы там ни было, Ясинский пилотировал самолет с польским номером 004, поступивший после ремонта во 2-й отдельный истребительный авиаотряд в Харькове и летавший там до 1925 г. в качестве тренировочного истребителя (81, б). Не исключено, что в советской авиации имелся и еще один моноплан Фоккера.

A.Weyl Fokker: The Creative Years (Putnam)

The second fighter trials

   A second fighter-aircraft competition was held at Adlershof in June 1918. The Kogenluft had urged the holding of more such trials to speed up the equipment of front-line units with the best types. Aircraft development was moving rapidly; in quantity and quality the Allied air forces were making great strides.
   Imperial Germany was fighting with her back to the wall. Superior weapons were urgently needed; in spite of all the shortages in Germany, industry had to produce these weapons. Thomsen and Siegert realized that frequent changes in aircraft equipment could no longer be avoided. They did not expect wonder-weapons, but they were confident that better aircraft and engines could be made.
   Hauptmann Kurt Student had been made responsible for the organization of the trials. He imposed strict but sensible rules, taking all possible precautions against interference by industrial interests. No civilian was admitted to the aerodrome while the trials were in progress, apart from essential mechanics. Each aircraft with a stationary engine was allowed two mechanics; each rotary-powered machine was allowed three.
   When E. Rumpler, the arrogant director of the Rumpler works, was spotted in the forbidden area, Student had him removed instantly: he was marched out between guards with rifles and fixed bayonets. Rumpler’s undignified expulsion provided all the pilots with immense amusement.
   This was the same Kurt Student who, six years later, became one of the founders of the Reichswehr Luftwaffe. Later, he formed the first parachute and glider airborne forces. During the Second World War he became known as the conqueror of Eben-Emael and of Crete, and as commander of the defence at Arnhem.
   Fokker learned of Rumpler’s discomfiture and deemed it politic not to show up at Adlershof while the ban on civilians was in force.
As a preliminary, Student and two other experienced fighter pilots tried all the competing aircraft in flight. They then agreed upon their qualities and drew up a kind of short list of the most likely types. These were the Fok. D.VII, Zeppelin D.I, Pfalz D.X11, and Rumpler D.I, all with the 160-h.p. Mercedes.
   The operational pilots, among them Reinhard, Loerzer, Goering, Udet and von Schleich, had three tasks to perform. First they were to fly the various aircraft and give their opinions on flying qualities, manoeuvrability, diving performance, field of vision, and combat qualities. To this end they had to complete forms immediately after landing, in the presence of the duty officer.
   Secondly, they were to participate in the group flying of aircraft having the same engine. This included a climb to 5-0 km. (16,500 ft.), at which altitude the aircraft had to race each other for an assessment of their relative speeds. They were also to be raced at a height of 1-0 km. (3,300 ft.). All aircraft were weighed beforehand; all had to carry the same load, which included three barographs.
Finally, the pilots were to attend the concluding discussions and hear technical reports on the aircraft by Adlershof specialists, flying assessments by the official test pilots, strength characteristics, maintenance features, and the like. The results of the competitive flying by the firms’ test pilots were also to be made known at these discussions.
   Hauptmann Student gave the findings of himself and his officers, based on their test flights. Staff Engineer Eydam reported on the strength of the aircraft concerned; Oberleutnant G. Madelung gave the results of the type tests.
   It was considered that these arrangements would prevent the final selection from being influenced by anything but strictly military considerations.
   A total of thirty-nine single-seat fighters, either prototypes or variants, took part in the competition, entered by a dozen firms. Fokker’s entry included Fok. D.VII biplanes, Fokker-built and licence-built, and the V.24 with the 220-h.p. Benz Bz.IV. The few monoplanes came from Fokker and Junkers only.
   Fokker’s monoplanes included Platz’s latest creations, the parasol-wing monoplanes V.26, V.27 and V.28. These were generally similar, but differed in their engines and engine installations. The V.26 had the 110-h.p. Oberursel UR.II, the V.28 had the 145-h.p. UR.III. The V.27 was a parallel development, but was much larger and had the 195-h.p. Benz Bz.IIIb, a water-cooled V-eight engine.
The initial comparison flights divided the competing aircraft.into seven groups; all the aircraft in any one group had the same type of engine.
   The 160-h.p. Mercedes group was the largest. It included Fok. D.VII No. 230/18, the type-test aircraft, and two Fok. D.VIIs built by Albatros and Ostdeutsche Albatros; the new Albatros D.XII; the Rumpler D.I, Junkers D.I, Zeppelin D.I, Pfalz D.XII and the Schutte-Lanz D.VII. It was also to include the Naglo D.I quadruplane, but this was withdrawn at the request of the Albatros works.
   A promising type of advanced design was the Zeppelin D.I, an all-metal cantilever biplane designed by C. Dornier. But while being flown on July 3 by Hauptmann Reinhard, Manfred von Richthofen’s successor as leader of Jagdgeschwader 1, the upper wing broke away and Reinhard, who had no parachute, crashed to his death. He had been pulling out of a dive when a wing bolt sheared; the wing folded back and broke away.
   This accident had two consequences. Front-line pilots were under even more stringent prohibition from flying types that had not passed the structural tests at Adlershof. The darker consequence was that the notorious Goering was made successor to Reinhard: the Kogenluft had yielded to the pressure of his influential friends.
   The second-largest group of aircraft comprised those with 140/160-h.p. rotary engines. These were the Fokker V.28 parasol monoplane (Factory, No. 2735) with the improved UR.Ill; four Siemens-Schuckert biplanes, all of different types and with various versions of the Sh.3 engine; two Pfalz D.VIIIs; and two L.F.G. Roland biplanes. A Roland D.XVI parasol was expected but was not ready in time. The Goebel Goe.III engine was also represented.
   The group of aircraft powered by the ungeared Benz Bz.IIIb engine included the Fokker V.27 parasol (Factory No. 2734), and four biplanes by Albatros, Aviatik and the L.F.G.
   The fourth group embraced all the aircraft with geared V-eight engines. In it were the second version of the Fokker V.27, and biplanes by Albatros, the L.F.G. and Daimler. The Daimler D.I (designed by H. Klemm) was the only entrant with the 185-h.p. Mercedes D.IIIb.
   Aircraft with the 185-h.p. B.M.W. IIIa engine formed another group. There were only three, by Fokker, Pfalz and the L.F.G.
   Two biplanes had the high-compression 220-h.p. Benz Bz.IVu engine: these were the Fokker V.24 (Factory No. 2612) and the Pfalz D.XIV (Factory No. 2800), which was similar to the Pfalz D.XII.
   The last group consisted of four aircraft powered by the 110-h.p Oberursel UR.II. These were the Fokker V.25, Fokker V.26 and two Kondor biplanes designed by W. Rethel.
   The heaviest aircraft present were those with the 220-h.p. Benz Bz.IV six-cylinder engine. This power unit was an emergency solution to relieve the shortage of Mercedes and B.M.W. engines. With a weight of 1,032 kg. (2,280 lb.), the Pfalz D.XIV was heavier than the Fokker V.24, which weighed 1,006 kg. (2,210 lb.). At the other end of the scale were the Fokker V.25 (564 kg.: 1,240 lb.) and Fokker V.26 (556 kg.: 1,120 lb.). Among the 160-h.p. Mercedes group, the Rumpler D.I was decidedly the lightest.
   During the flying by firms’ pilots, the Flz. weeded out a number of types that were obviously out of the running. These included the taperwing Fokker V.21 (Factory No. 2310) with its high-compression Mercedes D.IIIau engine; its climb was poor, and it took 45 minutes to reach a height of 5-9 km. Also rejected was the Fokker V.23 mid-wing monoplane (Factory No. 2443) with the ordinary 160-h.p. Mercedes D.IIIa. Kulisch made two officially observed climbs in it.
   The V-eight engines were too new and gave a good deal of trouble, even when flown by the firms’ pilots. The hotted-up versions of the Sh.3 in the Siemens biplanes also proved troublesome, but the standard engine performed well in other firms’ aircraft, and produced amazing climbs.
   Schmarje, one of Fokker’s pilots, made an excellent climb in the Fokker V.28 with the 200-h.p. Goebel Goe.IIIa, on June 5. He reached a height of 5-0 km. (16,500 ft.) in 10-7 minutes, and 6-0 km. (19,700 ft.) in 16 minutes. The aircraft had an oversize airscrew of 2-7-m. (8-9-ft.) diameter, and its take-off weight was 626 kg. (1,380 lb.). This climb was a record. Schuetzenmeister, another works pilot, put up a slightly better time but with less than the prescribed military load. The V.28 was well thought of, but its engine had not yet passed the official trials.
   Other Fokker works pilots who made officially observed climbs were Neisen, Grosse and Kulisch. Fokker himself did not take much part in this competition flying.
   The aeroplane with the best climbing performance was the Rumpler Ru. D.I with the high-compression Mercedes D.IIIau engine. It even surpassed the Pfalz D.XIIf with the B.M.W. IIIa engine. The Fok. D.VIIF could not improve on third place among the fighters with water-cooled engines.
   On June 17, demonstration flights were made in the presence of the Kogenluft, General von Hoeppner, accompanied by other high-ranking officers of the German Army Flying Corps. On this occasion, representatives of the industry were admitted.
   The best of the Fokker, Junkers, Pfalz, Rumpler and Siemens-Schuckert types were flown in mock combat by officers of the Adlershof establishment, all of them experienced fighter pilots. “Defeated” aircraft were required to withdraw and land.
   Among the rotary-engined aircraft the last survivors were the Siemens-Schuckert D.IV and the Fokker V.28 with UR.III engine; the Siemens was flown by Leutnant H. J. Rath, a specialist on Siemens types.
   When the Siemens-Schuckert D.IV, with its amazing manoeuvrability and controllability, appeared to be superior, Fokker asked to be allowed to fly his parasol monoplane against the biplane flown by Leutnant Mueller. But even Fokker’s skill was not enough to beat the Siemens. After landing he explained that he had less experience of the V.28 than Mueller of the D.IV. This was true enough.
   However, the general impression created by the Fokker V.26/28 design was so good that a substantial production order was placed with the Fokker works. The production aircraft were to be equipped with the 110-h.p. Le Rhone engine until the 145-h.p. UR.III and the new 200-h.p Goebel Goe.IIIa were cleared for operational use, when these more powerful engines would be installed. The fighter pilots were in complete agreement with this proposal of the IdFlieg.
<...>

The Fok. E. V. (V.26 and V.28)

   One reason why Fokker had wanted a light monoplane with a rotary engine was that production would not be affected by delays in engine supplies. There was still a large store of excellent Le Rhone engines at Adlershof, to be had for the asking, and Oberursel could produce many more for him.
   The Fokker V.26 was more or less a V.13 with the bottom wing removed. The parasol arrangement gave the pilot a field of view that surpassed all earlier efforts; Platz was also convinced that it made the aircraft more stable.
   The V.26 wing was structurally similar to that of the V.25; it had a plywood skin and inset, unbalanced ailerons. The spar flanges were a little lighter than those of the V.25 because the cantilever span outboard of the cabane structure was comparatively short. The flanges were laminated by gluing together planks of 10-mm. (0-39-in.) thickness. Platz took great care to ensure that splices in such laminated members were staggered.
   The wing-attachment fittings were bolted to filler blocks that were glued into the spars between the flanges. These blocks were built up of glued pine laminations. There were diaphragm bulkheads between the spar flanges at each rib-attachment point.
   The trailing edge of the central cut-out was stiffened by a laminated former. In the central portion of the wing the ribs were pitched at a distance of 300 mm. (11-8 in.); outboard of the cabane structure the inter-rib distance was 320 mm. (12-6 in.). The skin, of 1-5-mm. plywood, was attached to ribs and spars by glue and by 1/2-in. steel pins.
   Platz set great store by perfectly smooth wing surfaces. All protuberances were avoided; the surface was carefully polished and lacquered. On the V.26, the cantilever span was 2-88 m. (9-5 ft.) on each side.
   The ailerons were small but effective. They were 160 cm. (63 in.) in span, 20 cm. (7-9 in.) in chord. The spar of each aileron was a steel tube, each end of which was plugged and bore a steel pin. These end-pins engaged with bearing sockets let into the rib tails between which the ailerons lay, and thus acted as pivots; each aileron also had a central hinge close to the control horn.
   Structurally, the fuselage was simple, for it had to provide no direct wing attachment; it retained its basic rectangular cross-section. The wing supports consisted of two rigid, widely-splayed tripods for the front spar mounting, and two adjustable struts for the rear spar.
   The engine mounting, tank installation, controls, and the tail unit, were essentially similar to those of earlier monoplanes and the Fok. D.VI. A single fuel tank was fitted, immediately behind the engine, which it fed by gravity. The tank was divided, one section containing the oil.
   Platz could rightly claim that this parasol type was the simplest and cheapest single-seat fighter ever built. He had achieved his aim.
   The V.28 was very similar to the V.26, apart from having strengthened spar flanges and different engine mountings. It was to have rotaries of up to twice the power of the Le Rhone; some of these needed a fore-and-aft mounting. The fuel capacity was enlarged.
   Although the official strength tests were carried out on an aircraft of V.28 design, the production Fok. E.V had the 110-h.p. Le Rhone.

The Fok. E. V in service

   In June 1918 the Fokker V.26 was officially adopted for the use of the Germany Army Flying Corps. It was given the Service designation Fok. E.V in its basic form with the 110-h.p. Le Rhone engine. It was to be superseded by the V.28 as soon as suitable engines were approved and in production. The Admiralty also decided to equip naval fighter squadrons with the Fok. E.V.
   Before these decisions were taken, the V.28 with UR.III engine was subjected to a type test on June 6 and recommended for production as Fok. E.Ve, subject to clearance of the engine. Final trials to determine the serviceability of the eleven-cylinder Oberursel had still to be undertaken. In fact, however, only Beute Le Rhone or UR.II engines were flown in Fokker fighters on the Western Front until the end of the war.
   After the obligatory structural tests had been satisfactorily passed, 400 parasol-wing fighters were ordered from Fokker. The order was given to the Schwerin works on Fokker’s assurance that he could meet the rate of production demanded by the IdFlieg. The stipulated rate of delivery was to be eighty aircraft per month after an initial period of two months, allowed for the organization of production. Fokker promised to dispatch the first small batches within two weeks or so. He kept his word - at a dreadful cost.
   Six Fok. E.V were rushed to the front late in July, and a total of twenty had been supplied before the month was out. On August 7, the Jagdgeschwader I von Richthofen received six Fok. E.V; others went to Jagdgeschwader II for Jagdstaffel 19, and to other units.
   After the new type had been in operational use for only a few days, Leutnant Rolff of Jagdstaffel 6 (of the Jagdgeschwader von Richthofen) was fatally injured when his E.V sustained a wing failure at a height of 300 m. and crashed near Bermes. Two days later, Fok. E.V No. 107/18 of Jagdstaffel 19 lost a wing: it broke 10 cm. outboard of the cabane struts immediately after the unfortunate pilot had done three rolls at a height of 600 m. The starboard wing was salvaged and sent to Adlershof. A day or two afterwards, a third wing failure caused another fatality.
   The Fok. E.V was immediately grounded; an Aircraft Crash Investigation Commission was set up and ordered to report its findings urgently. At the Flz., a technical investigation was initiated. The whole procedure was precisely the same as had been adopted in the case of the Fok. Dr.I crashes. Acceptances of further Fok. E.Vs were postponed until the type was cleared. No acceptance flights were made after August 23, 1918; no more flight tests were made until the last week in September, when the Fok. D.VIII emerged.
   Goering, then commander of the Jagdgeschwader von Richthofen, was unable to prevent these drastic measures, which were bound to annoy his friend Fokker: he happened to be on leave at the time. His deputy, Ernst Udet, acted resolutely and correctly. It was therefore not possible to hush things up, and full evidence was available to the investigating commission.
   Before discussing the findings of the commission it will be relevant to consider the results of the official structural tests, which had produced very reassuring results. All specified load factors were attained without failure or excessive deformation. The starboard wing had sheared at the cabane struts only when 140% of the specified load factor of 2-5 in Case C was applied: this was more strength than was required.
   The Fokker Works were asked to replace the rear struts (which were of streamline section, 45 x 22 x 1-0 mm.) by struts of 55 x 22 x 1-0 mm. section. This was merely a precaution against the possibility that one of the struts might be damaged by a bullet or shell splinter. The firm readily agreed to this modification. Platz was not consulted.
   As a precaution, being mindful of their past experience of Fokker quality, the Flz. technicians subjected the Fok. E.V wing to a weathering test. The strength and safety of the Fok. E.V depended, more than in any other aircraft, on glued plywood structures; and the Flz. had noticed that such structures, when made at Schwerin, were badly affected by moisture and consequently lost strength and rigidity.
   For this good reason they took the Fok. E.V wing that had undergone the static test, and exposed it to the weather for four weeks from June 23. Water was poured over it several times a day during this period. Finally the plywood skin blistered and wrinkled, and could be crushed by hand; in some places the laminations had separated.
   And yet this damaged wing still had an ultimate load factor of 5-92 in Case A when tested (the required factor was only 5-0); at this value both spars failed at the strut attachments. The safety of the Fok. E.V under adverse conditions was thus established; the only suggestion that was made was to recommend better lacquering inside the wing, to reduce moisture absorption still further. This weathering test was quite separate from the basic structural test; it had nothing to do with the accident investigation, either.
   In the full structural test, the fuselage longerons buckled when subjected to 115% of the specified maximum loads. The elevator control circuit and the undercarriage were not tested because they were identical with those of the Fok. D.VI. A minor item was a request for the strengthening of the forked tube that held the rudder bar.
   On the basis of these favourable results, the Fok. E.Ve had been given a full clearance by Hauptmann Dr. W. Hoff on June 25. Coming so soon afterwards, the evidence collected by the Crash Investigation Commission was a severe shock to the IdFlieg and the Kogenluft.

The Inquiry

   The officer in charge of the Crash Investigation Commission was Leutnant von Mallinckrodt, an engineering test pilot of the Flugzeugmeisterei. He had flown the first Junkers monoplane on its initial flights in December 1915. The other members of the commission were Staff Engineer Henzel and Sergeant Schubert (a chief mechanic and, in civilian life, a professional engineer).
   On August 24 the commission met at the staff HQ of the Jagdgeschwader von Richthofen, and began to sift the evidence. Fokker, who had been instructed to inspect the wreckage of the crashed Fok. E.V, was requested to attend this preliminary discussion.
   As a possible cause of the wing failures, the theory was advanced that the wings might have failed in torsion from twisting at a high lift loading; this could have produced greater incidence towards the wing tips (i.e. wash-in) with a correspondingly adverse loading gradient. Fokker grasped eagerly at this theory, feeling relieved that a “hitherto unsuspected aerodynamic wing loading” could be held responsible. It was clear to him that only such crass oversight by the aerodynamicists could have caused the wings to fail.
   To make the Fok. E.V safe, the commission recommended that external cable bracing be fitted to prevent the wings from twisting. As a further safeguard, the front spar should be made stiffer, the rear spar less stiff: this, it was thought, would prevent the wing tips from twisting to a greater angle of incidence under load. Of less comfort to Fokker was the added comment that new wings should be more carefully built, and their interior better protected against moisture by lacquer or varnish.
   That the emphasis in the commission’s opinion was misplaced was made grimly obvious when the production Fok. E.V wing was subjected to a physical examination at Adlershof. The starboard wing of E.V No. 107/18 had not been completely destroyed, and it was thoroughly inspected.
   The workmanship was at once seen to be deplorable, and defective timber had been used for the spars. The wing of another machine. No. 110/18, showed the same deficiencies. Fok. E.V No. 127/18 was even worse: water had collected inside the wing, the wood of which was rotting. When the plywood skin was cut, a stream of foetid water flowed out, indicating that the casein glue was perishing.
   Closer investigation of the remains of the wing of 107/18 showed that the plywood was of acceptable quality. But the pins that attached the skin to the ribs had been driven in carelessly; most of them had missed the rib cap-strips or had merely splintered them. The glued joints were likewise defective. In fact, the plywood skin was adhering only in parts to the wing structure.
   Similar carelessness in pinning was found in the attachment of the plywood webs to the wing spars; moreover, the material used for the spar webs was inferior. The pine used for the flanges of both spars was brittle: it was still “green” and had been insufficiently seasoned. Most glued joints were poor and it was obvious that they had been ineffectively clamped.
   It was incredible that so many blatant defects had managed to pass any kind of inspection.
   But there was worse to come. When the cross-sections of the wing spars of this production wing were compared with those of the aircraft that had undergone the type test, it was discovered that the lower flange of the front spar of the crashed aircraft was only 7-5 mm. (0-295 in.) thick, as against 13 mm. (0-515 in.) in the type-test aircraft. The rear spar of the salvaged wing was missing and could not be checked.
   Fokker was asked to come immediately to Adlershof to attend discussions and loading tests on these production wings. Sensing that something unhealthy was in the offing, he took Platz along with him to act as a kind of lightning conductor in case a storm should break. It was Platz’s first and last visit to the Flugzeugmeisterei; and he had, of course, only a vague idea why his presence was required.
   A meeting to clear the technical aspects of the matter was held on August 30, 1918. This was primarily to discuss a redesign of the wing. In the chair was Leutnant von Mallinckrodt; Fokker and Platz were present. Two staff engineers from Adlershof attended: Krueger of the Central Acceptance Commission (ZAK) and Stelmachowski, the strength expert of the experimental department of the Flz.
   Von Mallinckrodt (who had been on good terms with Fokker and later became his demonstration pilot in international military competitions) pointed out that the Fok. E.V wing had to be redesigned and strengthened. Fokker jumped up, referring to a letter that he had sent to the IdFlieg', he complained that he had received no reply. It was in fact an impudent letter, in which Fokker had laid all blame for the wing failures squarely on the Adlershof technicians. These had, so Fokker alleged, failed to take account of wing loadings that actually occurred in flight: they had laid down absurd loading cases for the strength-testing of military aircraft: their sand-loadings were unrealistic. And this was why the wings of the Fok. E.V had broken.
   Fokker’s hypocritical outburst was as far-fetched as it was unfounded. Its only purpose can have been to act as a kind of smoke screen and to evoke the sympathies of his old benefactors, the regular officers.
   Von Mallinckrodt, who had enough technical knowledge to recognize Fokker’s accusations as ill-founded, merely referred to the written report of the experimental department of the Flz. This indicated that the wing spars of production Fok. E.Vs were weaker than and different from those originally approved. This, and the obviously bad workmanship present in the wings, were the only subjects for discussion.
   After this, Fokker had no more to say. He was told that two more of the existing production wings would be tested. If they too had weaker spars, then all wings already built would be condemned. These wings would be withdrawn from front-line units at Fokker’s expense. Also at his expense, they would have to be speedily replaced by redesigned and satisfactory wings.
   It was stipulated that all new Fok. E.V wings must be at least as strong as the wing of the type-test aircraft. Stelmachowski wanted wider spars. Fokker protested that the existing spar width provided enough strength (he was right), and that a change would necessitate the design and manufacture of new ribs and fittings: this would hold up deliveries. Stelmachowski admitted that the original spars had been satisfactory. It was therefore left to the Fokker works to decide how the requisite strength should be achieved; but any redesigned wing would have to be proof-loaded in the presence of Adlershof representatives before it could be accepted. The IdFlieg would define, in writing, the exact conditions for such a test.
   Fokker was required to give an undertaking that the utmost care in supervision of production would be taken in future, and that materials and workmanship would be satisfactory. The Bauaufsicht would be given a reminder to perform their duties more strictly.
The replacement wings were to be supplied with the minimum of delay. Again, stress was laid on the need to protect all internal and external surfaces of spars, ribs and skin against moisture.
   Stelmachowski’s report mentions that Fokker was accompanied by one “Ingenieur Schlotz”, but it does not record any utterance by the thus-misspelt Platz. Possibly the IdFlieg and Flz. representatives thought Fokker’s burly, taciturn companion was either a kind of bodyguard or a police shadow provided by a security department. The Army men were never closer to the solution of the mystery of who designed the wonder aeroplanes of the uncouth Dutchman. And they missed it!
   Platz did not in fact open his mouth, and his opinion was never invited. No-one attempted to find out who he really was, and why he sat there with Fokker.
   If Fokker had attended the secret conference of all aircraft designers held by the Flz. on August 23, he might have hesitated before delivering his misguided philippic a week later. An invitation to send a representative had been sent to the Fokker works but of course Fokker had ignored this opportunity to increase his firm’s technical knowledge. Platz was unaware that any such conference was being held.
   At the conference Stelmachowski had communicated the new loading conditions that were incorporated in the BLV 1918 edition. These had been formulated specifically to cover cantilever wings. It was prescribed that such wings should not only withstand the direct drag load of twice the weight: the revised Case C conditions required torsional stiffness of the wing under a torque of 1 -75 times the chord times the weight. This was to represent the case of a terminal-velocity dive; under this torque the wing should not twist by more than ten degrees at the tips. Distortion at the wing tips under sand loading to the limits of Cases A and B should not exceed five degrees. Furthermore, the Flz. would henceforth examine front and rear spars separately to determine their behaviour in bending and twisting.
   The conference of aircraft designers had accepted the new proposals after a lengthy discussion of their implications.
   As far as Fokker and his outburst were concerned, the important fact was that the draft of BLV 1918 had been prepared in the spring of 1918; it was therefore obvious that the Adlershof technicians were fully aware that wing deformations in flight could lead to abnormal aerodynamic loadings. The new requirements had in fact been derived from the original theory of the Fok. Dr.I accidents and from wing failures on Albatros sesquiplanes.
   When the meeting broke up, Fokker thought that the storm was now over. The affair had cost him a considerable sum, but at least he had given those Adlershof theorists a severe shaking.
   But on September 3, the Fok. E.V wings were sand loaded in the presence of Fokker and Platz. Platz had memorized the principal dimensions of the spars and was horrified to see by how much the production spars differed from his original design: their lack of strength was obvious. The flanges were smaller and wrongly laminated. To make matters worse, the more highly stressed upper flanges, which had to withstand the greatest compression load, were even thinner than the lower flanges. The spars had evidently been made upside down.
   Platz discreetly conveyed this alarming information to Fokker and let him understand that production at the works must have slipped up badly, for the wings must be seriously under-strength. This did not seem to impress Fokker greatly: he hoped that these little discrepancies would cause no undue fuss, and that perhaps the slide-rule pushers would not notice them. For him it was good enough that the Crash Investigation Commission had established the primary cause of the wing failures as a hitherto-neglected aerodynamic effect. The rear spar was too strong and too stiff: the commission had said so. Besides, wings did occasionally fail, especially when roughly handled by ham-fisted pilots.
   While Platz experienced acute discomfort, Fokker was airily unconcerned. He brazenly denied any possibility of careless manufacture and poor workmanship: no blame for these tedious crashes could be imputed to his factory.
   A standard sand-loading test was made of the wing of the undamaged production Fok. E.V No. 127/18. It began to fail at only 77% of the specified load in Case A; complete collapse occurred at 108%. The deflections measured at the wing tips differed from each other. This was peculiar: it indicated different spar sizes in the port and starboard halves of the wing. Platz’s discomfiture grew. Fokker merely grumbled about the futile activities of busybodies while there was a war on.
   Two days later, another wing was sand loaded. It had been taken direct from the Schwerin production shop by the Bauaufsicht at the behest of Hauptmann Hoff. It collapsed when 74% of the specified load in Case A was applied.
   The Fokker firm was now requested to supply an experimental wing at the earliest possible moment. The port half of this wing was to be of standard production quality; the starboard half was to be reinforced in accordance with the official recommendations. Platz quietly ignored this specification and had the entire wing made to the standard of his original design.
   This “experimental” wing was delivered on September 7. Its weight was 73 kg. (161 lb.), compared with the 69 kg. (152 lb.) of the wing of the type-test aircraft. Under test it sustained no less than 191% of the specified sand-load in Case A; that is to say, it proved to have an ultimate load factor of 9-5. When fully loaded, its tips twisted by no more than one or two degrees in Cases A and B. It resisted 112% of the specified load in Case C.
   The Flz. technicians were satisfied that a wing of this strength could not possibly break. They were also certain, now, that the wing failures had not been caused by twisting under load.
   In view of the urgency, experiments were conducted to determine whether the addition of cable bracing to the available, under-strength wings could make them acceptably safe until properly constructed wings were made. A new wing from the current production batch was sand loaded. One side was left cantilever, the other was braced by lift cables that ran from the undercarriage-attachment points on the lower longerons to points on the spars 2-7 m. (9-0 ft.) from the centre line.
   The cantilever half of the wing deflected by 144 mm. (5-68 in.) at the tip, the braced half by 86 mm. (3-38 in.). The wing resisted an ultimate sand load of 133% in Case A. The cable bracing could therefore be accepted as an emergency solution.
   Yet another production Fok. E.V wing was tested to destruction; this one was one of the wings withdrawn from front-line units. It started to break up at only 82% of the specified load in Case A and failed completely at 128 %.
   In their reports to the IdFlieg, the Flz. technicians demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt that the wing spars of the production Fok. E.V were materially weaker than those of the approved type-test aircraft, and differently made. The IdFlieg regarded as indefensible the supply of fighting aircraft that were structurally weak, even if some few were just capable of supporting the specified loadings. This was a gross breach of trust: the Army could not overlook it.
   Moreover, as the Flz. pointed out, even although some undersized spars could just withstand the loadings, such wings flexed and twisted more easily. This threw additional strain upon the skin which, carelessly glued and pinned as it was, failed before the specified loading limit was reached. The Flz. would never have passed any of the production Fok. E.V wings: they ought never to have been fitted to any aeroplane.
   With the atrociously bad workmanship thus exposed, the Flz. recommended that all existing Fok. E.V wings should be scrapped. If this could not be done immediately, lift cables would have to be fitted as a temporary measure until the wings could be replaced. However, it is doubtful whether any Fok. E.V was ever flown operationally with such cables.The final report on the Adlershof investigations was signed by Oberleutnant G. Madelung in the absence of W. Hoff.

Fokker in trouble

   Now the fat was in the fire. Such blatant disregard of official standards, such flagrant breach of trust, had never happened before in the supply of aeroplanes for the Army. The matter was made very much worse by Fokker’s persistent denials that he or his works were in any way to blame. To the Prussian soldier of that time, rigorously trained to be at all times truthful in matters of duty and to admit blame unhesitatingly when instructions had been violated, Fokker’s attitude was incomprehensible.
   But the Dutchman was shocked out of his blustering self-justification when he received an official letter, dated September 3, 1918, from the IdFlieg. It was signed by Major F. Wagenfuehr, the all-powerful chief of the new Inspektion des Flugzeugwesens (Inspectorate of Aeroplane Equipment).
   This communication made it plain that criminal proceedings against A. H. G. Fokker were under consideration, because he had knowingly supplied dangerously defective equipment to the Army, thereby causing the deaths of military personnel at the front.
The letter had been composed by Hauptmann W. Hoff, an officer in the reserve, a quiet man of scientific mind and not at all an arrogant militarist. He expressed Wagenfuehr’s views thus:
   “I am amazed to learn from memoranda and reports how your firm has carelessly and irresponsibly endangered the lives of fighting pilots, and of the incredible way in which you have tried to shift responsibility for this on to other persons. Contrary to your contentions, the facts at my disposal establish: either
   (1) you have deliberately had the wing spars made weaker than those of the type-test aircraft, although you as the designer knew the consequences; moreover, you have concealed this modification although it has been the cause of the wing failures; or,
   (2) because workshop drawings were not available, you and your personnel failed to know the correct dimensions of the spars of the prototype aircraft; but instead of determining them correctly, you deliberately and without further investigations ordered incorrect dimensions to be used in production wings.
   “No other explanation can be found for your action. To give you the benefit of the doubt, I presume the second alternative. But this, too, must be deemed criminal.
   “You now claim to have conducted, after the fatal accidents, tests proving that your production wings had insufficient strength. Such tests should have been conducted beforehand, instead of-to use your own words-advancing senseless statements unsupported by facts.”
   This official communication upset Fokker. It was the last thing he expected from his friends in the Army whom he had served so well in the past. He would have felt even more upset had he known that Hauptmann Hoff, the principal aircraft expert, had specifically advised the institution of criminal proceedings against Fokker and the Fokker works.
   However, the public prosecutor took no action before the Armistice. While the war lasted, reasons of expediency and policy may have prevailed against prosecuting the young Dutchman. He was a kind of popular hero with a world-wide reputation: to put such a man in the dock might have been damaging to the war effort. It would have been harmful to the Army Flying Corps. Even under wartime secrecy, unpleasant facts might leak out.
   Inevitable though the attachment of guilt to Fokker was, he was not personally so guilty as the accusations suggested. It had never occurred to him that it would pay him to tell the truth.
   The root causes of his troubles were avarice and his childish desire to maintain the make-believe image of himself as a great engineer and an aircraft designer of genius. For these faults he could justifiably be blamed - but not for deliberately making a criminally dangerous modification of the wing spars. He might also be blamed for lack of responsibility, but not for deliberately endangering the lives of front-line pilots.
   All that he had wanted was quick, cheap production of the Fok. E.V. As usual, he had failed to understand that this was impossible with the facilities at his disposal. The best that could be expected of his ramshackle and ill-equipped production shops was the construction of small batches of aircraft, each one virtually hand-made. His arrogance and his ignorance of engineering led him to believe that he could attain the exaggerated delivery figures that he had quoted (by guesswork) merely by goading his assistants and workmen.
   Furthermore, good workmanship and the best materials had never interested him; nor had he troubled to engage trained production engineers. In short, his attitude towards aircraft production had not changed since 1911. In 1918 this outlook was archaic and dangerous.
   At the Perzina works, which made wings for Fokker's aircraft, supervision and inspection were lax. Speedy production was all: everything made was good enough for aeroplanes regardless of its condition or how it had been made. This policy of quick production suited Fokker.
   That the Bauaufsicht continued to tolerate such skimped and shoddy workmanship was indefensible. So seriously did this official body fail in its duty that its members inevitably seemed to be suspected of being in Fokker’s pay.
   The spars for the Fok. E.V wings had been made without proper jigs. While the plywood webs were being joined to the flanges by gluing and pinning, the webs had been allowed to move down the faces of the flanges, leaving the flanges projecting outside the webs. This made the spars too deep to pass through the ribs, so the “excess” material of the flanges was simply planed away, thus reducing the thickness of the flanges. In this way, some spars had half the thickness of their flanges planed away.
   Apparently no-one noticed that the designer had made the top and bottom flanges of different thicknesses, consequently the spars were assembled in random fashion, and not a few had the weaker flanges on top, where the greater strength was required.
   The Perzina management neither noticed nor cared about these things. All they cared about was the production of something that, from the outside at least, looked like a Fok. E.V wing.
   So it had not been a case of wilfully revising spar dimensions or lack of production drawings. Fokker personally had no reason to change the spars, nor would he have done without consulting Platz. This was a simple case of lack of supervision, inspection and production organization: the rest of the Perzina Works production was just as bad. For quickness, holes in fittings were punched instead of drilled; timber for spar flanges was not selected and inspected before being laminated; and so on.
   Platz was shocked when he discovered the whole truth. Now that things had taken such a bad turn for him, Fokker too was alarmed by these discoveries.
   Fokker now relinquished engineering responsibility for production work; he left it to Platz. Platz took over the management of the Perzina factory, in addition to his other responsibilities. A satisfactory inspection organization was introduced, and a lot of dead wood was cut away.

Fokker's own story

   One would have thought that after such an episode Fokker would have kept quiet about his Fok. E.V experience. Not a bit of it! In his autobiography he brags about it and would have the unsuspecting reader believe that he had scored a resounding victory over the Adlershof technicians. And yet, Fokker may even have believed this, after so many years of presenting his personal version of the facts.
   Fokker wrote (or allowed his biographer to write) that the rear spar of the Fok. E.V was strengthened on the instructions of the technicians; the first six parasols were modified accordingly and rushed to the front. This, he claimed, was the cause of the wing failures.
   The documentary evidence, extracts from which are incorporated in the foregoing account of the Fok. E.V investigation, contains no vestige of support for Fokker’s story. The Fok. E.Ve that had been subjected to the initial strength tests at Adlershof had been found to be completely satisfactory. No request was made for any spar to be strengthened. The failures occurred solely because the spars of production wings had been badly made and were consequently too weak.
   In his version of the matter, Fokker tells the reader that the investigation found neither defective workmanship nor inferior materials. This is palpably untrue, for it is in direct contradiction of the actual recorded and photographed findings of the Crash Investigation Commission and the engineering investigators at Adlershof.
   The measure of Fokker’s “truthfulness” lies in his assurance:
   “All spars had been fully up to dimensions, and the workmanship was the usual high standard.”
   Hoff and Wagenfuehr had thought otherwise.
   “A demand was made that all wings be replaced and reinforced. This seemed pointless, and would mean an enormous loss to the factory.”
   What else could the German authorities have done, faced with such criminal mismanagement - faced again with the negligence that, at least once before and less than nine months earlier, had cost the lives of gallant pilots?
   “Not satisfied, the engineering department tested half a dozen more wings before reluctantly admitting that we were not to blame for the weakness.”
   Wagenfuehr’s letter conveys a different impression.
   Hoff was a man of great integrity and would have been the last to deny any mistake made by his engineering department. He would never have accused Fokker if there had been a shadow of doubt in the matter. In fact, he had defended Fokker when the safety of the Fok. Dr.I was in doubt. It was Hoff who had saved Fokker’s skin by pointing out the possibility that aileron loadings might have occurred that the BLV failed to take into account.
   Fokker makes his genius as an aircraft designer plain in this passage:
   “I took a new wing out of production and treated it to a sand-load test in our factory ... the deflections of the wing were carefully measured ... I discovered that with the increasing load, the angle of incidence at the wing tips increased perceptibly. 1 did not remember having observed this action in the case of the original wings, as first designed by me. It suddenly dawned on me that this increasing angle of incidence was the cause of the wing’s collapse ... It was the strengthening of the rear spar-ordered by the army’s technical bureau- which had caused an uneven deflection along the wing under load ... The resultant torsion caused the wing to collapse ... At first the army technical bureau wouldn’t give in ... Eventually, it was agreed that the old specifications were correct.”
   Comparison of this extract from Flying Dutchman with the true facts of the episode will show that the quoted passage contains a careful mixture of fact and fiction that creates a credible distortion of the truth.
   It has already been shown that the Flz. technicians knew, long before Fokker could have known, that unfavourable wash-in of a wing under load could produce adverse load gradings. What is even more significant, in view of Fokker’s version of the facts, is the extent to which the Fok. E.V wing distorted under the limit loadings: the proof-loadings at Adlershof showed the actual change of incidence to be only 1 -08 degrees in Case A and 2-17 degrees in Case B. Since the BLV 1918 allowed as much as 5 degrees in both cases, the distortion of the Fok. E.V was comfortably within the acceptable limit. Fokker could and should have known this, because copies of the reports reached him through the Bauaufsicht.
   During 1922, Dr. W. Hoff, the Director of the German Aeronautical Research Establishment (D.V.L.) and in charge of all airworthiness investigations in Germany, published the findings on Fok. E.V wings as DVL Report No. 36 (and in English as an N.A.C.A. report). Fokker made no attempt to challenge Hoff’s statement that the measured deformation of the Fok. E.V wing was perfectly tolerable.
   Platz explains that even if the rear spar had been strengthened and stiffened, the twisting of the wing under load would have varied very little because the plywood skin made it so stiff in torsion. This was, in fact, borne out by the Adlershof tests. Platz thinks, however, that the load factors stipulated in the BLV 1918 for fighters may have been on the low side. This is not a relevant factor, for Platz-designed wings always had a comfortable safety margin in strength.
   As soon as Platz took over responsibility for production, the new specimen E.V wing requested by the Flz. was supplied to Adlershof. As previously mentioned, this wing was identical with that of the type-test aircraft. It was tested from September 7 to September 10 at Adlershof and gave complete satisfaction under all loading conditions.
   As an additional safeguard against manufacturing errors, the Flz. requested that the thickness of all spar flanges be increased by two millimetres. This modification was agreed on September 24. Production of the parasol-wing fighter could now be resumed.

The Fok. D.VIII

   Acting on the suggestion of the Kogenluft, the IdFlieg changed the type designation from Fok. E.V to Fok. D.VIII for the aircraft with the properly made wing spars. This change was effected by issuing an order that all single-seat fighters, regardless of wing number and arrangement, should belong to the D category. The former E and Dr categories were thereupon abolished.
   No Fok. E.V could be flown, even by training units. All existing aircraft had to be modified with new wings and redesignated as Fok. D.VIII. All new Fok. D.VIIIs were carefully built under a system of strict supervision organized by Platz. He also set up a technical office for production design matters. This was responsible for minor modifications and the lay-out of production jigs.
   The effect of the wing-failure investigation was to delay the appearance of the Fok. D.VIII at the front until October 24, 1918. The first unit to receive the type was Jagdstaffel 11, led by Ernst Udet. The Fok. D.VIII also equipped Jagdstaffeln 1 and 23, and the naval Marine Land-Jagdgruppe Sachsenberg, where Theo Osterkamp's squadron received it.
   Production aircraft came along quickly, and the front-line formations were perfectly happy with their new fighter. During its brief operational career, the Fok. D.VIII gave a convincing demonstration of its capabilities, even with its low-powered engine. On November 6, 1918, three Spad fighters were shot down in a single combat with Fok. D.VIIIs, and American fighter pilots had sorry tales to tell about encounters with the “Flying Razor”.
   On November 1, eighty-five Fok. D.VIIIs were operational on the Western Front with army Jagdstaffeln; perhaps twenty more were with naval coast-defence units. No specimen of the type fell into Allied hands while the war lasted. Immediately after the Armistice many were flown into Holland and surrendered there. The Dutch Army was glad to receive these up-to-date fighters, which gave excellent service in Dutch hands, especially after installation of the 145-h.p. UR.III engine.
   Had the war gone on, the Fok. D.VIIIe (145-h.p. UR.III) and Fok. D.VIIIg (200-h.p. Goebel Goe.IIIa) would have been in service before the end of 1918. Most of these aircraft would have been fitted with the new undercarriage tank. However, it seems that no example of these advanced variants reached the front before the Armistice.
   The undercarriage tank had been tried during August. The first installation was made in Fok. E.V No. 238/18 (Factory No. 2879, with UR.II engine No. 3063). This aircraft was put through its acceptance flights by Matthias at Schwerin on August 21, 1918. It was intended for Udet.
   By the time of the Armistice the Fokker works had delivered 381 aircraft of the Fok. E.V/D.VIII type. Some of those built during November were not flight-tested and remained at Schwerin. Some of them may have found their way to Holland. Others were hidden away, but were found to have deteriorated badly when resurrected a few years later for experimental and training purposes by the Reichswehr.
   The rest, some with UR.III, Goe.III or Goe.IIIa engines, were handed over to the Allies in new condition. The U.S.A., France, Britain, Italy and Japan received numbers of Fok. D.VIIIs. In general, little was done with these aircraft: the Allied occupation authorities had heard about the wing failures of the Fok. E.V, but they had not troubled to find out the truth of the matter. Consequently, pilots were discouraged from flying these “dangerously fragile” monoplanes with their untrustworthy cantilever wings.
   In France and Britain the Fok. D.VIII monoplanes were simply allowed to rot. Nothing at all seems to have been done with these advanced aircraft, not even a trial loading to determine whether they were safe.
   Italy was more sensible. As late as 1925 a number of Fok. D.VIIIs were to be seen at the official experimental establishment in excellent flying condition. Except for some harmless play in the lugs of the wing-mounting bolts, these aircraft were as good as new.
   As already noted, the Dutch Army was well satisfied with its Fok. D.VIIIs. After 1923, however, it was considered that rotary-powered fighters were obsolete.
   The type was flown for experimental purposes in the U.S.A. In May 1921 the U.S. Army Air Service made a comprehensive assessment of a late production Fok. D.VIII, built in November 1918 in the D.520/18 to D.540/18 range (McCook Field Report No. 1676, Air Service Information Circular Vol. Ill, No. 288). This aircraft still had the 110-h.p.UR.II engine.
   The test pilot, First Lieutenant Leigh Wade, described the aircraft’s flying qualities as follows:
   “The aircraft has a tendency to turn to the right in taxi-ing, takes off very quickly, climbs very rapidly, and is very manoeuvrable. It is easy to fly, and the controls are sensitive. It is tail-heavy but so light on the controls that it is not tiresome to fly. The visibility is very good. The machine-guns are so placed that in the event of a crash the pilot would undoubtedly be injured by being thrown against them. The aircraft lands very slowly with a slight tendency to drop the right wing, and to turn to the right on the ground.”
   A British official report of March 1920 had been much less explicit. It was a second-hand description in vague terms of what a “representative of the British technical press” had stated after seeing a Fok. D.VIII flying at Amsterdam in August 1919.
   All who flew the Fok. D.VIII praised its flying qualities and its combat capabilities. It was not quite so manoeuvrable as the Fok. Dr.I and perhaps slightly inferior to the Siemens-Schuckert D.IV, but its pilot had a much better field of view. It was less stable than the Fok. D.VII, but more tractable.
   Undercarriage failures after heavy landings were not infrequent occurrences, but usually the resulting damage was slight, and the pilot was seldom hurt so long as he was strapped in and avoided striking his head against the butts of the guns. To the end Fokker failed to realize the need for adequate crash protection, and in this respect the Adlershof requirements were not strict enough.
   The more powerful versions of the type had somewhat different flying qualities. The Fok. D.VIIIg was reported to have good manoeuvrability, but its wings began to vibrate in steep turns. During prolonged spells of combat manoeuvring it also displayed a tendency to slip.
   It was a pity that these observations failed to reach Platz. What the test pilot had experienced was most probably a classic case of incipient wing flutter induced by aileron unbalance. This trouble was likely to occur because the centre of gravity of the plywood-skinned ailerons was well behind the hinge axis; moreover, the aileron control circuit was resilient. For these reasons the monoplane tended to develop flutter as soon as the critical speed was approached.
   In a later Fokker parasol-wing fighter, the D.X, wing failure occurred from this cause during 1924. Platz did not then know that the weight moment of the ailerons could be the source of the trouble; he thought it lay in lack of strength. The wing flutter was cured by fitting a mass balance to the aileron: this idea had not previously occurred to him, possibly because of his antipathy towards horn-balanced ailerons.
   Another problem arose with the Fok. D.VIIIs, which had the Siemens-Halske Sh.3a engine. This was the most powerful German rotary engine, giving up to 220 b.h.p., but at an airscrew speed of only 900 r.p.m. The torque reaction was considerable, even when a four-blade airscrew of somewhat smaller diameter was tried; the ratio of wing-span to airscrew diameter was as low as 2-8 to 1 or 3 to 1. This placed heavy demands on the small ailerons.
   In spite of this, the Adlershof test pilots reported favourably on the Fok. D.VIIIs. They found it pleasant to fly, particularly for aerobatics. The acceleration was greater and the manoeuvrability better than the other versions of the Fok. D.VIII with ungeared rotaries of approximately the same power. However, the landing was a little tricky if the blip-switch was used: if the aircraft and its engine were not intelligently handled, the intermittent torque reaction would make the aircraft touch down one wing low.
   This was not, of course, peculiar to the Fok. D.VIIIs; it was present, though perhaps less pronounced, in any rotary-powered aircraft. The Siemens-Schuckert D.IV biplane, which also had the Sh.3a engine, had much the same tendency as the Fok. D.VIIIs.
   It is doubtful whether any other single-seat fighter could better the Fok. D.VIII in terms of production costs. At the end of the war, the 1,800 workers at Schwerin were producing eight aircraft every day of the week. With a ten-hour working day, this meant only 2,250 working hours per aircraft. This compared with the average production time, in 1917, of 4,200 working hours per Fokker fighter. For the A.E.G. C.IV (Fok.) built at Schwerin, a production time of no less than 8,700 hours per aircraft was required, although this two-seater was only a trainer. In the Fok. D.VIII, Platz’s objective of building the simplest and cheapest fighter had been achieved.

J.Herris, J.Leckscheid Fokker Aircraft of WWI. Vol.5: 1918 Designs Part 1: Prototypes & D.VI (A Centennial Perspective on Great War Airplanes 55)

Fokker V26
  
  There is almost no record of the V26 in Fokker or Idflieg orders documented at the time, so its identity is as yet unclear. It is possible that the V26 carried Works Number 2733, which lies between the V25 (Works Number 2732) and V27 (Works Number 2734). Perhaps the V26 was the machine that was used in the period from June 7 to 12,1918, as part of the Typenprufung (Type Test).



Fokker V28

  With the Fokker V28, Works Number 2735, Fokker finally produced another design destined for production as the Fokker E.V. The V28 shared its parasol monoplane configuration with the V27, but was a smaller, lighter machine that was tested with a variety of rotary engines. Its parasol wing solved the pilot’s field of view problem that had led to rejection of the earlier Fokker monoplane fighter prototypes at the cost of somewhat increased drag. Like the V27, the wing was moved above the fuselage just above the pilot’s eye level, giving the pilot exceptional fields of view both above and below the wing.
  The V28 was tested with three different engines during the Second Fighter Competition; the 110 hp Oberursel Ur.II, the 145-160 hp Oberursel Ur.III, and the 160 hp Goebel Goe.III. At this time only the Oberursel Ur.II was in production; the other engines were still in development. The V28 was the winner of the Second Fighter Competition despite its low-power 110 hp Oberursel Ur.II, the same engine that had powered the Dr.I Triplane. Despite its low-power the V28 was fast and maneuverable, and had an exceptional field of view for the pilot.
  From May 27 to 29, the V28 equipped with the Ur.II engine recorded climb times between 19.3 and 21.6 minutes to 5000 meters. On June 6, the V28 equipped with Ur.III reached 5000 meters in 13.4 to 14 minutes. From June 8 to 12, the V28 equipped with the Geo.III engine reached 5000 meters in 10.4 to 15.7 minutes.
  A second V28 [W/N 2738] fuselage went to the Flugzeugmeisterei for strength testing on 17 October 1918. A third V28 [W/N 3860] with the Sh.III Rhemag motor took part in the Third Fighter Competition in October at Adlershof.
  The first mention of an unbraced Fokker monoplane with a 160 hp Gobel engine is in the April report of Idflieg, which notes that the aircraft climbed to 5000 m in 11 minutes according to factory data. Since the use of the Goe.III rotary engine in a monoplane is so far only known for the V28, it must have been this model, although no further information was found on the attempt.
  Already in the next Idflieg monthly report in May, it was decided to build the Fokker Parasol monoplane with 110 hp Ur.II engine as the E.V instead of the 60 D.VIs not yet delivered from the order for 120.

Fokker V28 Specifications
Engine: 110 hp Oberursel UR.II
145-160 hp Oberursel UR.III
160 hp Goebel Goe.III
160 hp Rhemag Sh.III
Wing: Span 8.34 m
Area 10.7 m2
General: Length 5.865 m
Height 2.82 m
Empty Weight 360 kg
Loaded Weight 560 kg
Maximum Speed (UR.II): 200 km/h
Climb (UR.II): 3000 m 7.5 min.
4000 m 10.5 min.
5000 m 14.7 min.
6000 m 19.5 min.

J.Herris, J.Leckscheid Fokker Aircraft of WWI. Vol.5: 1918 Designs Part 2: D.VII & E.V/D.VIII (A Centennial Perspective on Great War Airplanes 55b)

Fokker E.V/D.VIII

  During the Second Fighter competition, held at Berlin - Adlershof in May-June 1918, Fokker entered two new Oberursel UR.II-powered monoplane prototypes with cantilever wings, the V25 and the V28.
  An airframe offering even better overall performance than the Fokker D.VI was required, and it was to be compatible with both the 110 hp UR.II engine as well as the more powerful UR.III eleven-cylinder engine, which was expected to replace it on the Oberursel production line soon.
  Other companies also entered similarly-powered prototypes, such as Pfalz with their D.VI and Kondor with their D.II. But the Fokker designs stole the show, especially these two monoplanes.
  Of all the rotary-powered prototypes evaluated at this competition, the Fokker V.28 was decided to have the best overall performance. Fokkers other entry in the category, the low-wing V25, was rejected due to the limited downward visibility, in spite of its excellent performance. Oddly, the mid- and low-wing layout of the early Fokker E-types caused no reservations three years earlier.
  The V28 was flown with both the nine-cylinder UR.II, which later powered most production examples, as well as eleven-cylinder UR.III. Tests were also conducted with the Goebel Goe.III and Siemens-Halske Sh.III engines.
  Very quickly the V.28 was ordered into production under the official designation Fokker E.V after the mandatory type-tests were successfully passed in early July 1918. Interestingly, the first five examples of the type were accepted as early as 3 July, before frontline pilots at the competition came to the decision that the type should be put into production. The E.V had impressed pilots at the competition so much that half of the production order that had been placed for the Fokker D.VI was cancelled in order to free manufacturing capacity for the new monoplane fighter. The E.V not only had much better performance, it was also easier to build, and the plywood-covered wing saved linen fabric that was needed to cover the airframes of almost all aircraft then in production in Germany.
  Unlike the D.VI, the Fokker E.V was obviously intended right from the start to serve at the most active sectors at the front with some of the most prolific fighter units. The component unit of choice in Jagdgeschwader I was Jagdstaffel 6. The Staffel received nine or ten examples on 5 August. Jagdstaffel 19 (JG II) was selected to receive the E.V in early August as well, and in Jagdgeschwader III the component unit of choice was Jagdstaffel 36. It is worth noting that these three units had all operated the Fokker Dr.I until fairly recently. In fact, Jagdstaffel 36 was still operating a few Triplanes as late as August, Jasta 19 flew them until mid-June, and Jasta 6 until mid-May. Consequently, many of the pilots in these Jastas were still accustomed to the rotary engine, as were the ground crews. And all three Staffeln mentioned had operated the Fokker D.VII before they received the E.V. This fact is clear evidence that the overall performance of the new monoplane was not considered to be inferior to the D.VII in any way.
  Further examples of the E.V were delivered to the Marine Feld Jagdstaffeln, as well as to some of the component Jastas of Jagdgruppe 1 and Jagdgruppe 12. Considering that, a large number of the new fighters were delivered within a few weeks, it is likely that single examples found their way to other Jagdstaffeln as well.
  The Fokker “Parasol”, as it was quickly dubbed by the Jasta pilots, left a lasting impression on those flew them and encountered them in combat.
  It is not known for sure which Jasta was the first to receive the new fighter. The aircraft delivered to Jasta 6 are well documented, and it is known that many of the E.Vs delivered to the unit on 3 or 5 August were accepted at Schwerin between 13 and 19 July. However, 14 examples were accepted between 3 and 12 July, and logic would imply that these were delivered a bit earlier to other units than Jasta 6. One of the five aircraft accepted on 3 July was 107/18, which crashed at Jasta 19, indicating that this unit may have been the first recipient of the E.V. Details reporting on the frontline use of the aircraft at Jasta 19 are unfortunately not available. It is known that Lt. Hans Pippart crashed to his death on 11 August 1918 flying a Fokker D.VII, following a balloon attack. But the new Parasol would probably not have been the first choice for such a mission beyond enemy lines at the time. So it is possible, though unconfirmed, that the two victories that Ulrich Neckel was credited with on 13 and 14 August may have been claimed while flying the E.V.
  Fortunately, Lt. Richard Wenzl left some interesting insight into the use of the plane at Jasta 6 in August 1918. According to him, the new aircraft were picked up on 5 August from the Park at Clermont, while the Jasta 6 war diary notes that they arrived on 3 August. Wenzl noted that the performance of the type powered by the 110 hp Oberursel engine was exceptional, although it was designed for the 140 hp engine. Being the technical officer of Jasta 6, Wenzl was fairly well informed about the higher-horsepower engine, and he may have gotten this information from one of the JG I members who attended the Second Fighter Competition at Adlershof just recently.
  He goes on to report that the ground forces were not informed about the new type of aircraft and greeted them with a hail of ground fire during initial trial flights along the front. Again, according to the Jasta 6 war diary, Lt. Paul Wenzl came under heavy fire from all German positions during a test flight of the E.V on 3 August, even though all German units in the area had been informed about the fact that JG I was to operate the parasol now. This is more evidence that the information about the drastically new-looking fighter was not properly distributed to everybody pulling a trigger on the German side.
  Familiarization visits to neighboring units soon followed, and thanks to these a surprisingly large number of photographs of Jasta 6 Fokker E.Vs is now available to us. At the outbreak of the British offensive on 8 August, Jasta 6 pilots initially kept flying their Fokker D.VIIs rather than the new type for understandable reasons.
  After the unit moved to Bernes on 12 August, they finally brought over their E.Vs from Chambry, and worked them up for combat use.
  Unfortunately, the old Fokker illness of shoddy workmanship had its final wartime outbreak with the E.V. On 16 August, Lt. Riedel, Jasta 19, demonstrated the recently-arrived E.V 107/18 to several of his comrades on the ground by putting the plane through some extreme low-level aerobatics. A simplified eye-witness report by Jasta 12 pilot Lt. Hans Besser reported that “suddenly a wing came off”, indicating that a large section of the wing broke off in flight. Riedel reportedly tried to bail out, but he was flying at too low an altitude to escape. He was killed in the ensuing crash.
  Just three days later, a very similar accident occurred at Jasta 6. Lt. Emil Rolff, who had scored the first victory on the E.V at Jasta 6 on the day of Riedel's fatal crash, fell victim to an identical form of wing failure. At 9:50 a.m., while conducting a test flight, the wing failed at low altitude, variously reported as being at 300 or 800 meters. Like Riedel before him, Rolff could not escape from the plunging aircraft in time and lost his life.
  At just the same time, other pilots of Jasta 6 were engaged in a fierce fight against Sopwith Camels at the front, flying their new “Parasols”. Lt. Richard Wenzl reported that he had forced one of their opponents from 5500 meters down to 200 meters when engine failure forced him to break off pursuit. He only just made a safe landing with a standing propeller. During the same combat, Lt. Matzdorf was credited with a Sopwith Camel at the time of Rolff's crash, and this may have been the second victory scored by Jasta 6 pilots on the “1918-monoplane”.
  If that was the case, it was also the last one, since the acting commander of JG I, Ernst Udet, took immediate action and grounded the type in the Geschwader. The news of the second fatal crash quickly made the rounds, and as a consequence the order to ground the type in all units was issued quickly. On 24 August production and acceptances at Schwerin were halted until the cause(s) for the fatal accidents had been identified and rectified.
  Engine failure was also a common problem for the pilots of Jasta 6, just as before on the Fokker Triplane. Wenzl reported that 30 forced landings occurred over a period of ten days of use of the E.V, but not one of them resulted in a crash. Rightfully, he and his men were proud of this accomplishment, and it also speaks highly of the handling qualities of the aircraft in unpowered flight.
  Jasta 35 commanding officer Rudolf Stark was another witness of the E.V, albeit under somewhat unusual circumstances, directly related to the above mentioned events. He left an interesting recollection of the plane in his book “Die Jagdstaffel Unsere Heimat” (published in English under the title “Wings of War”).
  By late August 1918, Jasta 35 was one of the few remaining Jagdstaffeln to be fully equipped with worn-out and outdated Albatros D.Va, Pfalz D.IIIa, and Roland D.VI fighters. On 24 August, the long-awaited call from the local Armee Flug Park came in, informing Stark that six new Fokker D.VII were ready to be picked up by Jasta 35 pilots. The six pilots that had seen the longest service with the Staffel were selected to receive these treasures, and in exchange the six worst performing aircraft (three Rolands, two Albatros, and one Pfalz) were returned to the Park.
  After the pilots had processed the paperwork that came along with picking up the new aircraft they still had some time left to tour the Park. There they came across a new type of fighter which immediately caught their attention. Stark wrote: “Amongst the single-seaters are a few new machines we don't know yet: Fokker monoplanes with rotary engines. Strikingly beautiful things. The latest Fokker has brought out. Jagdgeschwader I was scheduled to receive them, but currently the type is still banned since a few improvements have to be implemented.
  Those are great prospects for the future. Fokker stays Fokker. Each new type by him is a major improvement. The other companies are bringing out new types as well, but usually they have only changed their appearance somewhat, the flight- and combat performance has not improved much.”
  This statement is highly interesting in more than one way. To begin with, the fighters were not scheduled to be delivered to JG I, they had been returned by JG I, Jasta 6 to be exact. And Stark and his men must have seen the unit markings that were applied to these monoplanes, denoting previous frontline service. But the exact reason for the aircraft being stored at the AFP, the recent wing failures, are not mentioned by Stark. Either he was not informed about this by the AFP staff in order not to tarnish the reputation of the new type, or Stark wanted to withhold the information from the reader. The admiration he expresses for the new aircraft in his writings suggests the former theory.
  Secondly, apparently the pilots of Jasta 35b had not been informed about the arrival of the new type at the front, around three or four weeks after it was first introduced. This does not speak well for the required circulation of such crucial information amongst the Jagdstaffeln in the summer of 1918.
  Immediately after the plane was grounded, Anthony Fokker himself travelled to the front and visited both Jasta 19 and Jasta 6 in order to learn more about the accidents. And no doubt this trip was also intended to dispel any kind of mistrust against his company at an early stage.
  The exact date of his arrival is unclear, but Jasta 19 still had their examples of the E.V on hand, and Fokker lost no time to demonstrate his faith in the strength of his design. He managed to convince two dozen members of JG II to climb onto the wing of an E.V and even took motion picture footage of this “human load test”. Several photographs were also taken at the event. When he visited Jasta 6 around the same time, he found that their E.Vs had already been returned to the AFP, where Stark then saw these planes. At Jasta 6, Fokker then had himself photographed next to the replacement planes that were delivered to this unit - which were O.A.W.-built examples of the Fokker D.VII. Very likely these were originally intended for Jasta 35b, which, being considered more of a “secondary” unit, now had to make do with just six D.VII (O.A.W.) for the time being.
  Faulty assembly procedures at the Perzina factory, which manufactured wings for Fokker, as well as improper dimensions of some of the wing spars, were found to be the main reasons for the wing failures. Moisture entering the plywood wing structure through breathing holes further added to the problem, and the combination of these factors caused the wing failures.
  These problems could be rectified fairly quickly by ensuring a more careful assembly of strengthened, correctly dimensioned, and fully varnished wooden wing components. Successful load tests of the wing were conducted on 7 September, permission to resume production of the fighter was granted on 24 September and acceptances continued on 8 October. Since Fokker was to blame for the problem, he was required to supply replacement wings for the 139 Fokker E.Vs that were delivered with the faulty wings at his expense. The official designation of the fighter was also changed, probably as a measure to restore faith in the “Parasol”. The “E” designation was dropped and the re-born fighter was baptized Fokker D.VIII.
  In October, a total 61 of the “new” fighters were accepted at Schwerin, but likely a maximum of around 40 of these were accepted in time to be delivered to the front before the armistice. To date, no evidence of delivery of any of these aircraft to a Jagdstaffel in the remaining weeks of the war has been confirmed. But unearthing this kind of information for the last few weeks of the war is very difficult indeed. Several were photographed in the immediate post-war period in Entente hands, but some of these certainly still carried the “E.V” designation, while on others no designation can be made out at all.
  Use of the Fokker E.V at Jasta 36 is also recorded, and available information paints a somewhat mysterious picture here. Photographs indicate that the E.Vs were still on hand at the unit as late as mid-September, well after the type had been officially grounded. Possibly the Staffel was hoping for a quick remedy to the wing problem and kept the planes for that reason. It seems highly unlikely that operational flights were continued after the flight ban, since this would have been in direct disregard of an official order. In any case, this kind of behavior is unusual. Eventually, replacements in form of the unloved Pfalz D.XII arrived at Jasta 36 - someone had to take these - and no record of preferential shipment of the Fokker D.VIII to the unit late in the war has been found.
  It should be pointed out that one Fokker E.V, 113/18, was shipped to Austro-Hungaria for evaluation purposes in early July. It was powered by a 150 hp Steyr rotary engine, and evaluation began on 26 July. The following month, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair as the result of a landing accident.
  While it has been stated that the prospects for the production of the Fokker D.VIII beyond the 335 examples ordered (out of which 289 were completed in Germany) were not good, an important fact should be pointed out. By the end of the war, full-scale production of the Oberursel Ur.III was finally underway, and the engine was fitted to many late-production examples of the D.VIII. At the end of the war, no other German manufacturer had a suitable airframe for the use of this engine in production. It would have been a completely logical choice to continue manufacture of the D.VIII to absorb these engines until a better airframe was available. But the end of the war intervened, and no fifth batch of the D.VIII was ordered by the German authorities.
  Several Fokker D.VIIIs were operated by the German post-war units until the Versailles treaty brought an end to these kinds of activities.
  Besides this, examples of the “Parasol" were flown in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland in the post-war period. Further information concerning the use of the aircraft by these countries can be found in “Fokker Aircraft of WWI, Volume 7”.


Fokker E.V / D.VIII Specifications
Engine: 110 hp Oberursel UR.II
Wing: Span 8.34 m
Area 10.7 m2
General: Length 5.865 m
Height 2.82 m
Empty Weight 405 kg
Loaded Weight 605 kg
Maximum Speed: 200 km/h
Climb: 1000 m 2.0 min.
2000 m 4.5 min.
3000 m 7.5 min.
4000 m 10.8 min.
5000 m 15.0 min.
6000 m 19.5 min.


Fokker E.V/D.VIII Production Orders
Quantity Ordered Quantity Delivered Engine Serials Works Numbers First Acceptance of a Production Aircraft
10 10 110 hp Ur.II 100-109/18 2741-2750 July 3, 1918
200 129 110 hp Ur.II 110-309/18 2751-2950 July 3, 1918
65 62 110 hp Ur.II 500-564/18 3255-3319 October 24, 1918
60 26 145 hp Ur.III 670-729/18 2672-2731(1) October 8, 1918
Note 1: The low works numbers for the last batch of D.VIII fighters ordered is because these numbers were re-assigned to the D.VIII from 60 D.VI biplanes ordered earlier that were cancelled. These aircraft were fitted with the 145 hp Ur.III, which finally achieved production.

J.Herris Fokker Aircraft of WWI. Vol.6: Foreign Service (A Centennial Perspective on Great War Airplanes 56)

Austro-Hungarian Fokker D.VIII

  The Fokker V28, prototype of the production E.V/D.VIII, won Germany's Second Fighter Competition in June 1918. The LFT was interested in this development and Flars purchased a production E.V 113/18 without engine or armament.
  The E.V was fitted with a 150 hp Steyr rotary at MAG and was assembled at Aspern on 25 July. The next day Lt. Mallinkrodt of the German air service performed "the most daring maneuvers that earned enormous applause from the spectators present." Uzelac congratulated Mallinkrodt and ordered Leutnants Kasser and Gawel to fly the aircraft. "Kasser even made a few loops" and both pilots were enthusiastic about the E.V. Seekatz reported that the "colossal forces" encountered during Mallinkrodt's demonstration, which he performed "almost more upside-down than normal" had bent the rear wing struts. Stronger struts were ordered from Schwerin. Flight testing was almost completed when the E.V was irreparably damaged in a landing accident in August 1918.
  Austrian interest in the parasol fighter remained high and an order for 50 aircraft had been mentioned, but German production of Voltol, a substitute for castor oil rotary engine lubricant, was insufficient to supply both air services. Flars requested Fokker build a parasol powered by a 225 hp Daimler, but the war ended before the aircraft, reported under construction in September 1918, could be completed

C.Owers Fokker Aircraft of WWI. Vol.7: Postwar (A Centennial Perspective on Great War Airplanes 67)

Australia

  Being a young country, Federation only occurring in 1901, Australia was anxious to prove its worth to Great Britain and followed Britain into WWI. Australia fielded a Flying Corps with one squadron in Palestine, and three on the Western Front as well as training squadrons in the UK.
  The Australian War Records Section (AWRS) was established to collect material and trophies for a Museum that was to be built after the war. Aircraft were particularly wanted. With the end of the war the Australian Government wanted their share of the aircraft that the Germans had to turn over to the Allies under the Armistice conditions. The aircraft obtained were stored at No.2 Aircraft Salvage Depot (ASD), Fienvillens, France. Seven Fokker D.VII were recorded as ‘New, complete.’ During the week ending 23 August 1919, a Fokker D.VII (no serial listed) and an E.V monoplane serial 140/18, were amongst the aircraft sent across the Channel to the UK. Eventually 16 German aircraft were shipped to Australia. They included Fokker D.VII (O.A.W.) 8371/18 and Fokker E.V 140/18. Both were recorded as ‘Complete.’
  The two Fokkers were exhibited at the Exhibition Building in Nicholson St, Melbourne, to raise funds for the proposed war museum. The Fokkers then traveled by train to the Motor Trader’s Association of South Australia’s show in 1920 in Adelaide. Here they were displayed with the local boys, the Smith brother’s, Vickers Vimy bomber that had flown out from the UK to Australia.
  The Australian magazine Aircraft, for 1 October 1920, records that when Parer and McIntosh arrived in Melbourne after their epic flight from England to Australia in a single engine Airco de Havilland D.H.9 biplane, they were greeted by an aerial escort of a DH9a, DH6, Fokker Biplane, Sopwith “Pups”, “Doves” and “Gnu”; Bristol scouts, Se5 (sic),Avro, Boulton and Paul and an old Maurice Farman. The Melbourne Herald newspaper for 31 August devoted much space to the “Airman’s Odyssey” and noted that amongst the machines was a Fokker from Point Cook - a captured German machine still bearing the signs of war service. This Fokker was the D.VII and was stunted over the city as part of the aerial welcome. Parer and McIntosh’s D.H.9 was later purchased by the Australian Government and ended up in the Australian War Museum (AWM)’s collection.
  Each state was offered one aeroplane but the two Fokkers were not allocated. In 1936 the AWM needed space in the part of the Exhibition Building it occupied in Melbourne. It was suggested that the aircraft stored here could be sold to raise funds for the Memorial. The aircraft were described as being in a very bad condition after being stored for a long time in cases which were not waterproof and had been raided once or twice by local ‘hobos’.
  The two Fokkers were included in the aircraft still in store. The RAAF inspected the aircraft and reported that the civil aviation authorities would never allow the aircraft to fly in Australia. The engines were said to be too expensive to consider selling them to operate from motor boats.
  There was a fire in the Exhibition Building in February 1925. The nightwatchman, J Kirby, reported that he came on duty around 10.30 pm and did his regular rounds. At 6 am he checked that the aeroplanes had not been interfered with overnight... At 12.20p. m. I was in the curators office when A. Horneman ran in through the engine room shouting to me to call the Fire Brigade. It was reported that five cases and their contents had been destroyed. Three cases were untouched. There was apparently no report on what was burned and what survived in the three untouched cases.
  Newspaper reports stated that six aircraft had been lost. Kevin Murray recalled seeing the Fokker D.VII still in the tin storage shed in the early 1940s. Mr Murray’s research showed that an aircraft, type unknown, was still stored in the iron shed in June 1948 when the Exhibition Trust notified the AWM that the shed was to be demolished. The aircraft had been disposed of by 16 September.


Belgium

  One Fokker E. V was flown in Belgium colours. This was Werke Nummer 2842, Serial No. 201/18. This was one of the E.V monoplanes that were brought up to D.VIII standard after the wing failures on the early E.V type. As far as is known this machine was never taken onto the Aeronautique Militaire register. It served a short time at the Flying School at Asch, apparently by Lt van Cotthem as his personal aircraft. Its eventual fate is unknown but it is assumed to have been scrapped.


Canada

  Canada received a single Fokker E.V, No. 132/18, that was received in the UK soon after the Armistice. It arrived at Toronto in the summer of 1919 shipped via SS War Peridat. Aside from the shipping records there is little information on this machine in Canada.


Italy


For its share of the aircraft from defeated Germany, Italy received from 127 to 131 aircraft. Amongst these were three Fokker D.VII and eleven Fokker D.VIII fighters delivered between June-July 1920.
- D.VII: 4192/18; 5210/18 and 7655/18.
- D.VIII: 177/18; 226/18; 241/18; 249/18; 302/18; 321/18; 501/18; 550/18; 679/18; 692/18; 693/18.
  One E.V/D.VIII was photographed at Furbara where the fighter gunnery school was located. An additional two D.VIII monoplanes (275/18 and 593/18) were also received as war reparations. These latter arrivals were based on Montecelio (Guidonia) airport, near Rome and were used only used for test purposes. Three Fokkers received Italian serials: - MM 192 to 194 in 1932. Why they received these at such a late date is unknown., but it was probably a means of ‘clearing the books’ of unwanted airframes.
  In the summer of 1921, the press reported that a squadron might be formed from the Four E.V monoplanes present at the time at the experimental station at Montecelio. After 1930 they were sold to the civilian market and entered on the Italian civil register. Three appeared on the Italian civil register as:
  I-BEAM (as c/n 3305 - 550/18), registration cancelled July 1926;
  I-ELIA (as c/n 3348 - 249/18). Cancelled as unusable November 1926. Restored 14 July 1927 (as c/n 3048). Registered to CNAI, Rome. I-ELIA was shown at the 1931 Giornata dell’ Aria at Littorio airport (Rome).
  I-FRAK (as c/n 2916 - 275/18). Dismantled October 1926.
  One D.VIII was displayed in a small museum in Monterotondo dedicated to the memory of Fausto Cecconi. Its fate is unknown but may have been the source of the fuselage that survives in the Caproni museum. The survivors were apparently destroyed during 1940, however, I-FRAK survived, the fuselage being displayed in the Museo Caproni, at Mattareloo airport in Trento; the only original Fokker E.V/D.VIII in the world.


Japan

  Amongst the assortment of aircraft ceded to Japan under the peace reparations were four D.VII fighters (230/18, 322/18, 8523/18 and 8587/18), four E.V fighters (172/18, 199/18, 220/18 and 221/18) and one D.VIII (507/18) fighter. One D.VII and one E.V were given to the Navy, one D.VII to the Army’s Aeronautical School.


Lithuania

  Photographs show a Fokker E.V/D.VIII on the Lithuanian airfield at Kaunas in 1919. Nothing further is known about this aircraft. The aircraft was still in German colours but in Lithuanian service. A Fokker D.VIII is recorded as operating with the German FA 25 in Lithuania in May 1919. There is no documentation available on the use of a D.VIII by Lithuanian forces.


Poland

  There were sixteen Fokker E.V and one D.VIII aircraft in Poland. They all came from abandoned aircraft left by the retreating Germans. Most of them were taken over in Wielkopolska (Region) of Poland, from Lawica at the ex German Die Fliegerstation Posen-Lawitz air base for Flieger Ersatz Abteilung Nr 4. Within a week after the capture of Lawica by the Polish Insurgents from Wielkopolska, seven operational Fokker E.V planes were sent to Warsaw. Assembled at Central Aviation Workshops (Centralne Warsztaty Lonicze, CWL), they received a new numbering with the type number: 00.
  At that time, the lack of fighter planes was most noticeable in the newly formed air squadrons. All of the airframes (except for one D.VIII) had the markings: Fok. E.V, applied to both the rating inscriptions on the fuselage, as well as the nomenclature in reports, combat reports, orders, etc. It is not known whether the E.V in Poland had new wings, built after October 1918, bringing them to D.VIII standard. The report on the accident of Fokker E.V No. 193/18 (00.2) crashed by Lt. pil. Ludwik Idzikowski at Lviv aerodrome was caused by wing failure, which was characteristic of a series of accidents in the German air force. It was known that in 1919, during repairs at CWL, modernization and conversion works were carried out for the wings for the Fokkers E.V.
  These modifications included the use of additional tendons from the lower flange of the front spar at the tenth rib to the clamp on the front landing gear leg. Such external stiffeners were made, among others, on planes Nos. 175/18, 191/18 (00.8) and 194/18. In addition, the struts were modified, e.g. on airframe No. 193/18 (00.2).
  Despite the infamy surrounding the E.V plane, Polish pilots did not have any resistance to flying these purebred fighters. They were equipped by the squadrons: 1st Wielkopolska Aviation Squadron (1.EW) (12 EW), 4.EW. (15 EM), 7 EL, 9 EW and 19 EM. The number of Fokker E.V fighters in any one squadron did not exceed three machines. They were also used for training at the Pilots School in Lawica and in the Air Handling School at SL Lawica. The participation of the E.V planes in the battles with the Ukrainians for Lviv and on the Southern Front was particularly noticeable.
  On the E.V 180/18 (00.1) aeroplane Lieutenant pilot Stefan Stec on 29 May 1919, fought an air fight with two Ukrainian planes, a Brandenburg and a Nieuport, which was shot down.
  The E.V planes also escorted reconnaissance aircraft, made assault attacks, ground strafing, reconnaissance and propaganda flights. As they were used up, they were withdrawn from frontline service, and after the renovation in CWL ‘for rear service and communication,’ a few survived until the end of 1920.
  By order of 210/lot/TJ of 18 January 1921, of the General Staff of the High Command of the Polish Army (Naczelne Dowodctwo Wojska Polskiego, NDWP), it was decided to withdraw the Fokkers E.V from the front-line squadrons to the storage in Lawica. After the war, a few were assigned to the Aviation Service School in Lawica. Fokker E.V No. 175/18 survived there the longest. Beautifully renovated, it was exhibited in April 1924, at the National Fair in Poznan on the roof of the LOPP pavilion in front of the Upper Silesian Tower. In January 1926 it was shown next to the rebuilt Friedrichshafen G.III bomber to compare the sizes of small and large aircraft. This machine did not fly anymore and was stored at the Air Service School at 3 PL.


Russia

At least one Fokker E.V/D.VIII flew in Soviet markings.


United Kingdom

The Fokker Monoplane

  The British Air Ministry reported on the Fokker E.V/D. VIII in June 1919. The machine was examined at Fienvillers on January 23, 1919
  Fokker Monoplane. This is a new design which should yield interesting results, when its performance can be investigated. In general it follows very closely the lines of the D.7 biplane, from which it differs in having a single main lane in the parasol fashion.
  No external wiring of any kind is used and the spars of the planes are supported by two pairs of V struts on each side, which spring from the tubular longerons of the fuselage.
  When examined the machine was not assembled and the pilot’s eyes are apparently on a level with the trailing edge.
  An auxiliary plane surrounds the undercarriage axle and is of the usual Fokker construction; it is covered with 3-ply wood and is deep enough to allow the axle to move up and down.
  The construction of the fuselage is identical in principle with the biplane except that in order to fair off the circular engine cowling light wooden framework are fixed at each side and also on top to support he fabric.
  The engine is the standard Oberursel Le Rhone, and the cowling covers about two-thirds of its disc.
  The date on this machine is 7/9/18.
  Source: Report by Technical Commission on German Aeroplanes and Engines. TNA AIR1/2094/207/12/8.


United States of America
  
  Fokker E.V monoplanes 106/18,108/18 and 166/18 were collected in Europe and were to be shipped to the USA.
  A Quantity Report on Overseas' Airplanes as of October 31st, 1919, listed the following Fokkers:
  Two (2) D.VI; Forty-two (42) D.VII, two (2) D.VIII and two (2) E.V fighters, out of a grand total of 943 foreign aircraft in the USA. Two E.V monoplanes were recorded at Americus, Georgia in July 1920. What became of these monoplanes is unclear. McCook Field used two Fokker D.VIII monoplanes with the Field Nos. P-165 and P-169. P-165 was referred to a Type III, while P-169 was a Type I, the same as other single-seat fighters. These two monoplanes were purchased off Fokker in the Netherlands, probably in early 1921, for they were at McCook Field in June 1921. It is possible that the monoplanes handed over in Europe were unserviceable by the time they reached the USA, and the US wanted airworthy examples for testing. An E.V was subject of a McCook Field report but it did not record the aircraft’s serial and appears to have been a description of the monoplane without any reference to actual flying the machine.
  McCook Field Report No. 1676 was issued to cover the ‘Official Performance Tests of Fokker Monoplane Type D.VIII Equipped with 110 H.P Oberursel Rot.’ The D.VIII was identified as P-165.
  The pilot’s observations were as follows:
  The airplane has a tendency to turn right in taxying, takes of very quickly, climbs rapidly, and is very maneuverable.
  It is easy to fly, and the controls are very sensitive. It is tail heavy, but so light on the controls, that it is not tiresome to fly.
  The visibility is quite good.
  The machine guns are so placed that, in the event of a crash, the pilot must undoubtably be injured by being thrown against same.
  The airplane lands very slowly with a slight tendency to drop the right wing, and to turn right on the ground.
  The controls for the engine are very inconveniently located, inasmuch as the throttle for the gas is on the left side of the fuselage, and the throttle for the air is on the left side of the control stick.
  Signed: Lieut Wade
  First Lieut. Air Service
  Test Pilot.

  After a distinguished career in aviation, Wade retired from the USAF as a Major General in 1955. Writing in 1973, he wrote that he remembered the Fokker D.VIII. The taxiing and flying characteristics as mentioned in the report are correct. One outstanding part of one flight test to altitude I long remember is that the machine gun mounts were used for the mounting of some of the instruments for the flight tests. The gun placement on the right gun was used for one instrument which required attention during the altitude climb. We did not have good face masks and as I thought the airplane would not go very high, I went with my face open to the wind coming in over the gun emplacement. Upon returning and landing I found that I had frozen the right part of my face and some of the left cheek. I went to the hospital immediately for treatment. No further trouble and no effect in my later life.
  However, Thomas G Foxworth records that other pilots experienced occasional viscous wing flutter, and quotes Fred Verville who witnessed how the D.VIII wing would ‘wave and shake.’
  P-165 was recorded a serial No. A.S.64345. It went to Salvage on 6 October 1926. It was recorded as having Le Rhone No. 94770 that was removed and sent to Stores on 13 February 1925. The air speed indicator was removed on 30 April 1925, and it was placed in the McCook Field Museum.
  P-169, serial A.S.94112, reportedly had Oberursel No. 94998 installed. It went to salvage 5 November 1923.

O.Thetford, P.Gray German Aircraft of the First World War (Putnam)

Fokker V 26
   Also taking part in the second D types Competition, the V 26 was a continuation of the V 17-V 25 monoplane lineage, and with the wing now in the parasol position it was the most successful. It eventually went into production as the E V, later redesignated D VIII. Engine, 110 h.p. Oberursel U II. Span, 8.34 m. (27 ft. 4 3/8 in.). Length, 5.86 m . (19 ft. 2 3/4 in.). Area, 10.7 sq.m. (115.56 sq.ft.). Weights: Empty, 405 kg. (891 lb.). Loaded, 605 kg. (1,241 lb.). Speed, 204 km.hr. (127.5 m.p.h.). Climb, 1,000 m. (3,280 ft.) in 2 min. Duration, 1 1/2 hr. Armament, twin Spandau machine-guns.


Fokker V 28
   Yet another E V - D VIII prototype, the V 28, was flown at the second D types Competition with 145 h.p. Oberursel U III and 160 h.p. Goebel Goe III installations. Both engines were eleven-cylinder rotaries and of larger than standard diameter, which necessitated the bulging of the cowling. The above machine is fitted with the Oberursel motor. For the third D types Competition, held only a few weeks before the Armistice, the V 28 was again re-engined, with the Siemens-Halske Sh III. The 145 h.p. Oberursel airframe flew at 605.8 kg. (1,333 lb.) and climbed 6,000 m. (19,680 ft.) in 18.5 min. with the 140 Goebel installation flying weight was 635 kg. (1,397 lb.) and climb to 6,000 m. (19,680 ft.) took 23.5 min. Armament, twin Spandau machine-guns.


Fokker D VIII

   After the success of the competition for single-seat fighters held at Johannisthal early in 1918 (in which the types were restricted to the use of the 160 h.p. Mercedes D III engine) the German High Command decided to hold another, and manufacturers were duly circularised to the effect that another competition would be held in April in which there would be no restriction on the size of either aeroplane or engine.
   Fokker had on hand Reinhold Platz' prototype parasol monoplane, the V 26 powered by a 110 h.p. Oberursel engine which, after modification, was thought to stand a good chance. Main alterations were the introduction of taper into the trailing edge of the wing with the ailerons inset; the original comma rudder was enlarged and a triangular fin added. Most manufacturers entered prototypes for the competition: Albatros, Kondor, L.V.G., Pfalz, Roland, Siemens-Schuckert, etc., which were flown and assessed by both official test pilots and by pilots from the Front Line Jastas. On their appraisal the final choice rested. Eventually the Fokker cantilever parasol was selected, as it combined a rapid take-off and climb with speedy diving ability, as well as considerable agility in combat manoeuvres.
   The aircraft was put into production immediately, and the first half dozen or so were rushed to the Front for operational assessment in August 1918. Jasta 6 was fully equipped with the type by 5th August, but an acute shortage of castor oil led to lubrication difficulties and many forced landings. The new aircraft were withdrawn from operations on 21st August. Three of these E Vs (as the aircraft was first designated) also crashed due to wing failure, and the type was grounded pending investigation. Two theories for the wing failure have been recorded. The first maintained that the rear spar had been strengthened on official instructions and that in this form the wing did not flex sufficiently to allow an even distribution of load, and consequently fractured. The second theory was that after the spars had been assembled and glued the top and bottom surfaces were planed down to clean them up, resulting in a weakened structure. Whichever theory is true, the fact remains that the fault was rectified and production resumed. Completed aircraft were brought up to specification and the designation was altered to D VIII, but by this time the war was in its final stages and there was no chance for this neat parasol monoplane to prove itself in combat. Jasta 6 of the Richthofen Geschwader had a few D VIIIs on its strength, and these were decorated with a black-and-white "petal" device on the cowling and black-and-white striped tailplanes. The Marine Jagdgeschwader also received some D VIIIs, and Lt. Theo Osterkamp secured his 25th and 26th victories while flying a machine of this type.
   In construction the D VIII still adhered to the Fokker composite formula of wooden wings and steel-tube fuselage, the latter being closely akin to that of the Triplane. It was a welded steel-tube box-girder in which the gauge of the tubes was progressively reduced from 22 mm. diameter at the nose to 18 mm. at the tail. The bays were braced as formerly, with stranded cables looped through quadrants welded into the corners and tightened with a single turnbuckle. The welded steel-tube tail surfaces also closely resembled those of the Triplane, except for the addition of the triangular fin. The tailplane was braced from the underside to the bottom longerons by two steel-tube struts. Fabric covered the complete fuselage and empennage. The neat circular cowling - which again bore a striking degree of resemblance to the Triplane - enclosed the 110 h.p. Oberursel, copied from the French Le Rhone engine.
   The cantilever wing, of pleasing proportions, had a parallel centre-section with angular cut-out, then tapered gradually to the rounded tips, which were strongly made from six fine laminations of ash. Ailerons were inset and unbalanced. The two hollow box-spars, which tapered towards the tips in both plan and elevation, were glued together and bound with fabric. Ribs were of three-ply with spruce flanges, and the whole of the internal structure was given a coat of varnish before being completely covered with three-ply sheet 1 1/2 mm. in thickness, fastened with 1/2-in. wire nails. This was again covered with fabric, resulting in a near stressed-skin surface: it also resulted in the disappearance of the scalloped trailing-edge profile which had characterised all Fokker aircraft up to this date.
   A tripod arrangement of streamlined steel-tube struts supported the parasol wing; the same material was utilised for the undercarriage chassis. The now familiar aerofoil lifting surface again enclosed the axle, spreader bars and shock-absorbing cords, and an internally sprung, steel-shod tailskid of ash completed the landing gear.
   Further development of the D VIII resulted in the basic airframe being fitted with 140 h.p. Oberursel (11 cylinders), 160 h.p. Goebel and 160 h.p. Siemens-Halske engines, but these remained no more than prototypes.
   Handling qualities of the D VIII were reported to be pleasant except for a tendency to turn to starboard when taxi-ing. In flight it was slightly tail heavy but so light on the sensitive controls that it was not tiresome to fly.
   From the cockpit visibility was first class, both upward and downward directions being almost completely unrestricted. Some criticism was leveled at the throttle (petrol) control being on the port side of the cockpit and the air adjustment control on the left side of the control column when it would have been much more convenient for them to have been located together.

TECHNICAL DATA
   Description: Single-seat fighting scout.
   Manufacturers: Fokker Flugzeug-Werke G.m.b.H. (Fok.).
   Power Plant: One 110 h.p. Oberursel U II 9 cylinder rotary.
   Dimensions: Span, 8.34 m. (27 ft. 4 3/8 in.). Length, 5.86 m. (19 ft. 2 3/4 in.). Height, 2.6 m. (8 ft. 6 3/8 in.). Area, 10.7 sq.m. (115.5 sq.ft.).
   Weights: Empty, 405 kg. (893 lb.). Loaded, 605 kg. (1,334 lb.).
   Performance: Maximum speed ground level, 204 km.hr. (127.5 m.p.h.) Climb, 1,000 m. (3,280 ft.) in 2 min.; 4,000 m. (13,120 ft.) in 10.75 min. Ceiling, ca. 6,000 m. (19,680 ft.). Duration, ca. l 1/2 hr.
   Armament: Twin fixed Spandau machine-guns synchronised to fire forward through airscrew.

W.Green, G.Swanborough The Complete Book of Fighters

FOKKER D VIII (E V) Germany

   Apart from his extraordinary prolificity, Reinhold Platz also demonstrated outstanding versatility: virtually simultaneously with his series of mid- and low-wing fighter monoplane prototypes, he was engaged in developing a parasol monoplane fighter. Contrary to popular belief, this fighter was ordered into production by the Idflieg prior to the second D-type competition, the first production examples being accepted some two weeks before the contest ended! This fighter, initially officially designated E V by the Idflieg in the Eindecker (monoplane) series, was the production development of the V 28. This, initially flown with a 110 hp Oberursel Ur II, was also tested with the 145 hp Ur III and 160 hp Goebel Goe in 11-cylinder rotaries. Similar airframes with different engines were the 110 hp Le Rhone-powered V 26, the V 27 and V 30 with the 195 hp Benz Bz IIIb and IIIa six-cylinder water-cooled engines respectively, and the V 29 with the 160 hp Mercedes D III. The E V was manufactured with the Ur II rotary pending availability of the more powerful Ur III and Goe III, and armament consisted of the standard pair of synchronised LMG 08/15 guns. Initial contracts called for 210 aircraft, with deliveries to the Fliegertruppe commencing in July 1918, in which month 59 were accepted (including one for evaluation by the Austro-Hungarian Luftfahrttruppe). Eighty E Vs were accepted during the following month, the last of these on 23 August when further acceptances terminated owing to wing failures. When acceptances were resumed on 8 October, a new wing was fitted, and, for some inexplicable reason, the designation was changed to D VIII (although externally it was impossible to distinguish between the E V and the D VIII). Eighty E Vs were listed at the Front on 31 August 1918 and 85 D VIIIs on 31 October. Of contracts for 335 E V/D VIII fighters placed with Fokker, a total of 289 was delivered (139 E Vs and 150 D VIIIs), 53 of the D VIIIs being delivered after 28 November 1918 without engines. All were powered by the Ur II engine, apart from 26 that received the Ur III. Operational usage of the E V/D VIII was strictly limited because of poor engine serviceability and the need to replace the wings of the E V.

Max speed, 115 mph (185 km/h) at sea level, 107 mph (173 km/h) at 14,765 ft (4 500m).
Time to 6,560 ft (2 000m), 5.08 min.
Range, 186 mis (300 km).
Empty weight, 847 lb (384 kg).
Loaded weight, 1,265 lb (574 kg).
Span, 27 ft 4 1/3 in (8,34 m).
Length, 19 ft 5 in (5,92 m).
Height, 8 ft 6 1/3 in (2,60 m).
Wing area, 115.18 sqft (10,70 m2).

P.Grosz, G.Haddow, P.Shiemer Austro-Hungarian Army Aircraft of World War One (Flying Machines)

Fokker E.V

  Reporting on the results of the Second Fighter Competition at Adlershof in June 1918, the LFT liaison officer wrote:
  The Fokker parasol powered by the 145 hp Oberursel Ur.Ill engine is the best fighter and superior to the Fokker D.VII. Initially intended as an interceptor (home-defense squadrons), it is now in demand by many of the frontline formations (i.e.: commanding officers who were present at the Competition).
  Flars purchased a production E.V 113/18 parasol fighter less engine, hoping to evaluate it in the forthcoming Fighter Evaluation convened at Aspern on 9-13 July, but the E.V did not leave Schwerin until 20 July 1918. After a Steyr-built 150 hp Le Rhone engine was installed by MAG, the E.V was assembled at Aspern on 25 July. On the next day, Seekatz watched Leutnant Mallinkrodt of the German air service perform "the most daring maneuvers that earned enormous applause from the spectators present." Uzelac congratulated Mallinkrodt and ordered Leutnants Kasser and Gawel aloft. "Kasser even made a few loops" and both pilots waxed enthusiastic about the parasol. Seekatz reported that the "colossal forces" encountered during Mallinkrodt's demonstration, which he performed "almost more upside-down than normal" had bent the rear wing struts. Stronger struts were ordered from Schwerin. Flight testing was nearly completed when the Fokker E.V was irreparably damaged in a landing accident in August 1918.
  Although LFT interest in the parasol fighter as a home-defense interceptor remained high and Uzelac had mentioned a purchase of 50 aircraft, German production of Voltol, a castor oil substitute for rotary engines, was insufficient to supply both air services. Flars requested Fokker build a parasol powered by a 225 hp Daimler in-line engine with the assurance of substantial production orders should the combination prove successful. The war ended before the Daimler-engined fighter, reported under construction in September 1918, was completed.
  In August 1918, Flars debated assigning Aviatik, MAG, and Thone & Fiala the license-manufacture of the Fokker D.VII and E.V fighters in a ratio of three-to-one beginning in early 1919, but the continuing shortage of Voltol forced a change of plans. In consequence, Flars proposed sending the completed 150 hp Le Rhone(St) rotary engines to Germany in exchange for either BMW in-line or Oberursel rotary engines at a later date when the Voltol supply was assured.

E.Hauke, W.Schroeder, B.Totschinger Die Flugzeuge der k.u.k. Luftfahrtruppe und Seeflieger 1914-1918

01. — 010. Flugzeuge ausländischer Produktion (Самолеты иностранного производства)
04.200 Fokker D.VIII (projektiert) St 160

90. Flugzeuge der Ungarischen Allgemeinen Maschinenfabrik, M.A.G.
90.04 Fokker E.V. WNr. 113/18 (Type D.VIII) St 160

Журнал Flight

Flight, August 28, 1919.

THE E.L.T.A. SHOW

THE FOKKER STAND

   Herr Fokker, having relinquished his German naturalisation, obtained, one presumes, for business purposes during the War, and become a Dutchman once more, was handicapped by not yet having had time to build works of his own in Holland since the armistice while German built machines, of any design, were not permitted. The three machines exhibited on his stand, while not built by Herr Fokker, although to his designs, were not, we learn, made in Germany, as has been hinted in certain quarters, but were, we are informed by the gentleman in charge of the Spyker stand, made for Herr Fokker by the Spyker works at Trompenburg. Three machines are exhibited, none of which show any striking departures from their prototypes built in Germany during the War, and which have been fully dealt with in FLIGHT. One of the machines is a little parasol monoplane, with 110 h.p. Clerget (Dutch) engine. It has the usual type Fokker cantilever wings, supported by four struts on each side. It is a single seater, and judging it by a similar machine flown with great skill by Lieut. Versteegh, has a very good performance.
<...>